WASTEFUL GOVERNMENT SPENDING AND MARKET DISTORTION: AN EMPIRICAL ACCOUNT OF MODERN INTERVENTIONISM’S UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.52195/pm.v21i1.947Resumen
El malgasto público puede ser abordado desde la tradición de Mises como un tipo de intervencionismo con consecuencias involuntarias, como lo son la distorsión del mercado y la creación de privilegios. Un problema subyacente en las prácticas de compras gubernamentales que encaja en el intervencionismo se da en las llamadas “culturas del malgasto público”. Estas representan un problema difícil de detectar en la práctica, que se manifiesta en pérdidas de bienestar al volver las distorsiones de mercado una tradición. La creciente compatibilidad de la Escuela Austriaca y los estudios de políticas públicas abre las puertas a una mejor comprensión de políticas imperfectas, sus consecuencias y las maneras de mejorarlas. Este trabajo ilustra cómo la distorsión de mercado se da bajo narrativas construidas, mientras grupos de interés capturan rentas a expensas de la ciudadanía. Empleando un análisis de costo efectividad en compras públicas de vehículos blindados en Colombia se identifica cómo se construye una tradición de compras públicas con resultados subóptimos, reflejando un planeador central fallido en la administración pública de un país en desarrollo.
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