

# COSMOLOGY AND IDEOLOGY IN THE PRACTICAL SOCIAL DISCIPLINES

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## I.

### A METAPHYSICAL APPROACH TO WORLDVIEW AND IDEOLOGY

We believe the assumption, widespread since the Modern Age, that *metaphysical* knowledge negates *scientific* knowledge to be erroneous. One *metaphysical* category is that of 'cause', and its importance for scientific explanation is hardly debatable. Moreover, since the early 20th century, the *philosophy of science* has had to address the (metaphysical) notions of 'cause' that are being used in the new scientific research and disciplines that have emerged since that time<sup>1</sup>. However, this argument alone is not sufficient to turn our attention back to *metaphysics*. The most important argument is that, whilst the *positive sciences* may continue to advance without regard for *metaphysics*, the *practical and social disciplines* cannot. The price to be paid is too high. Indeed, to disregard the metaphysical approach means forgoing an understanding of the various aspects of humanity as a *unified whole*.

It has long been argued, with sufficient justification, that the *practical-social disciplines* should have their own methodology<sup>2</sup>. However, those who put forward this argument overlooked the importance of *metaphysics* when it came to defining the *methodology* within each *practical-social discipline*. In this paper, we shall not explore this shortcoming theoretically. Rather, we shall see how

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<sup>1</sup> Bunge, M., et al., 1977.

<sup>2</sup> Dilthey, W., 1986.

the main concepts of the MFI that we proposed at the time<sup>3</sup> have a *metaphysical* foundation. We believe that, in this way, as well as clarifying the fundamental concepts of the MFI, we shall have indirectly provided arguments in favour of the metaphysical approach in the *practical-social disciplines*. It will become clear, incidentally, that reviving the *metaphysical* approach does not imply a rejection of *positive methodology* in the *practical-social disciplines*, but rather that the *metaphysical* perspective serves to clarify exactly what we can expect from *positive* and *quantitative methods* in this class of *disciplines*, we turn to the foundations of the *practical-social disciplines*, that is, to the ‘*worldview*’ and ‘*ideology*’ from which they are explained.

In this first section, we aim to address three issues: the first concerns the relationship between any ‘*worldview*’ and ‘*ideology*’ and *metaphysics* (which they presuppose<sup>4</sup>); the second deals with the etymology, relationship and difference between ‘*worldview*’ and ‘*ideology*’. Finally, we shall examine the connection between the *metaphysical* aspect and what was discussed in the second issue.

### A) From positivist practical-social disciplines to Metaphysics

The MFI we have presented treats *quantitative data* on social phenomena as just one element amongst all the possible phenomena in a society. The ‘*positive norm*’, ‘*individual action*’, ‘*social action*’, ‘*political actions*’ or ‘*prices*’, for example, are, for us, ‘*data*’. However, ‘*data*’ in itself is nothing. It begins to be something when it becomes an *element* that informs a *narrative*. Upon realising this simple truism, we understand that *mathematics* is an ‘*extension*’ of *formal logic*, which allows us to treat the *quantitative* and the *logical* as aspects

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<sup>3</sup> Atticus, C., LVII (2024).

<sup>4</sup> It is not that metaphysics encompasses the *practical-social disciplines*, but rather that it is present within the *practical-social disciplines*. And this relationship, let us note, is exactly the same as that between *logic* and the *practical-social disciplines*, so that, when we have formally presented our MFI, all we have done is take metaphysics and logic in what they have in common and which affects the *practical-social disciplines*, namely, their universality. See in detail Millán-Puelles, A., *Introduct.* (2002).

related to the *qualitative*, the *predicable* and, ultimately, the *narrative*. We do not deny that treating these dimensions of language separately leads to extremely important intellectual developments; however, in the refinement of the *practical-social disciplines*, they will make sense when placed within the horizon of the two subjects and the space of any *practical narrative*, namely, *God, man* and the *world*. Example: An *analytical logician* might suggest that *symbolic formal logic* is more precise than that which takes into account the *meaning of propositions*. And this is because, according to that school of thought, common language is a source of confusion<sup>5</sup>. So, if we heed those authors, we will accept that the logical multiplication (conjunction) of two propositions 'p' and 'q' is a commutative operation of the type ' $pq=qp$ '. And, of course, *we will believe* that such precision will provide us with great certainty and insight when it comes to understanding reality. However, we need only try to apply that formula to reality to realise the nonsense that can result from disregarding the meaning of common language; thus, for example, "*he was ill and died*" is very different from "*he died and was ill*". The former makes *real sense* in the sequence of events; the latter does not. In this sense, *metaphysics* does not deny the usefulness of the formula " $pq=qp$ " for, say, an operational language; it simply serves to situate it within that dimension of reality where it may be most useful.

In short, whatever these social '*data*' may be, what is clear is that they will begin to *mean* something when they come to make *sense*—that is, when they form part of a *narrative*. Now, the point where '*telling*', '*quality*' and '*narrating*' significantly converge is in *metaphysics*; that is why "*quality*", "*cause*", "*quantity*" and "*relation*" are *categories proper to "being"*, which, let us note, make *sense* when the "*worldview*" is concretised in *narratives* through the *predicates* concerning *God*, the "*man* and the *world*, by the *judgement* we make through the transcendental "*one*";<sup>6</sup> "*good*" and "*truth*". To

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<sup>5</sup> Whitehead, A.N., Russell, B., (1910–1913).

<sup>6</sup> This is evident when one considers the link between reality and number in metaphysics. From the proposition 'everything real is individual' derives the *real number*. The same occurs when all that is real is considered as "*being*" – thus being is "*one*". This is what is meant when the genitive term " $\tau\acute{\omega}\nu \ \xi\zeta\omega$ " is used, as Plato applies it to

demonstrate that this approach is correct, when addressing the subject of “worldview” and “ideology”, nothing could be simpler than to invite the reader to consider any “ideology” – including that of the *logical-analytical school* – and they will immediately see that it can be dissected using the aforementioned categories; they will verify that this *ideology* makes claims about the subjects “man” and “God” and how, in short, the “ideology” they have chosen establishes judgements of “truth”, “good” and “unity” regarding the “world”.

It is certainly true that today the *metaphysical* approach is marginal, and this situation therefore requires some further explanation. The reason for this marginalisation lies in the prioritisation of the *positive scientific method* over thought in the *practical and social sciences* from the 17th century onwards. In that century, it was argued and *believed* that one could only think with any guarantee of truth if thought was preceded by a *positive method*<sup>7</sup>. This had four fatal consequences for understanding *human action in society*. Firstly, *metaphysics* was disregarded and, consequently, ceased to be studied as a prerequisite for the study of Politics, Law, Sociology, etc. Secondly, the *practical-social disciplines* were fragmented into a myriad of ‘*social sciences*’ under the pretext of *positive specialisation*. In this sense, *specialisation* led to a loss of sight of the fact that *man* as such is one of the ultimate objects of all *practical-social disciplines*; moreover, by omitting God from reality, the possible ends towards which man could *freely* direct himself were reduced. In other words, it was thought that man was a *composite whole*, a sort of *machine*,<sup>8</sup> and that, by knowing its parts, one could account for the whole. The third entailed the separation of the *quantitative* and the *logical* from the *narrative* and, even worse, the making of the *quantitative* the sole source of a *logical proposition*, from which the *qualitative* and the *predicable* within a *narrative* were derived to

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external beings that have number, these being regarded as those present in the soul (*Theaetetus*, 198c and b) and, for his part, Aristotle refers to “ἐξω ὄν” as the external object opposed to that of the mind (*Metaphysics*, 1065a 23).

<sup>7</sup> Atticus, C., (2) 2004.

<sup>8</sup> La Mettrie, (1961). Highly illustrative in this regard is the 1926 drawing by the physician L. Chauvois, in which he compares the machinery of a car with the human body.

sufficiently explain human action in society<sup>9</sup>. Probability became the source of data on what *man* is<sup>10</sup>. Thus, this tool would become a key instrument for Sociology, Politics, Economics, etc. The fourth, finally, was to overlook that, in the *practical social* disciplines, the ‘*meaning*’ of reality is taken as a *reference* for the *logical* and the *quantitative*. In other words, both the *logical* and the *quantitative* require a *frame of reference of meaning within which to be validated*. In short, due to the first and second consequences, *metaphysics* ceased to be used as the predominant approach. Due to the third consequence, it was assumed that *quantification* and its relationship with *logic* could strip ‘*worldviews*’ and ‘*ideologies*’ of their fallacious nature<sup>11</sup>. And due to the fourth consequence, ‘*social scientists*’ believed they could provide a *meaningful narrative* of society through *quantification*, overlooking the fact that *quality*, *relationship* and *final cause* (of paramount importance for *freedom*) fundamentally determine *who* the human being is and what they do.

But, as things are what they are (whatever anyone may say) and *human nature* is what it is, the end result of replacing the *metaphysical* approach with the *positive methodological one* was, quite simply, that ‘*ideologies*’ changed their ‘*clothing*’, now being explained through the logical and mathematical apparatus characteristic of *scientific* language. Consequently, discussions regarding the positive method to be applied to the *practical-social disciplines* became intense and even

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<sup>9</sup> Although the following text is long, it is worth reproducing. It clearly shows how Kant attempts to have all the transcendentals (the One, Truth and the Good) absorbed by the category of “quantity”: “In all knowledge of an object there is unity of concept, which may be called qualitative unity, inasmuch as in it is thought only the unity of the composition of the manifold of knowledge, such as, for example, the unity of the theme of a theatrical performance, that of a conversation, that of a fable. Secondly, truth, in terms of consequences. The more numerous the true consequences of a given concept, the more numerous the signs of its objective reality. This might be called the qualitative variety of the features belonging to a concept as a common foundation (in it they are not conceived as magnitudes). Finally, thirdly, perfection, which consists in the plurality jointly leading back to the unity of the concept and agreeing completely with it and not with another, and which may be called ‘qualitative integrity’ (taken from the translation by Millán Puelles, A., 2002, vol. 1, p. 255).

<sup>10</sup> The development of probability began in the 17th century with the book *\*Games of Chance\** (1520) by Pierre Fermat and Blaise Pascal.

<sup>11</sup> Atticus, C., (2) 2024. On the “*fallacious*” connotation associated with the idea of “*ideology*”: Althusser, L., (1974); Van Dijk, T. (1998).

absurd (primarily because, as we noted earlier, the *positive sciences* such as *Physics* continued to advance, changing the notions of ‘mechanical cause’ without major difficulty, for example, when necessary, and, naturally, also the *method* by which they accounted for the new type of ‘cause’). And so, in the *practical-social disciplines*, which were swept along by *scientism*, we witnessed developments such as the following. From the paradigmatic ‘scientific’ ‘worldview’ of ‘modernity’ derives the atomistic *view* of the world and, hence, the ‘atom=commodity’ relationship upon which the *scientific socialist ideological* version is built, which, naturally, will treat *liberalism* as a *false ideology* that *alienates* the masses<sup>12</sup>. Conversely, authors such as Ludwig von Mises, drawing on a *rationalist methodology*, will defend *liberalism* against *socialist ideology*, treating the latter as false<sup>13</sup>.

The *metaphysical* approach, therefore, not only avoids the four errors we have identified in so-called ‘modernity’ when examining *social phenomena*, but also properly focuses the *practical social sciences* on their *subjects, objects* and *methods*. We emphasise that the *metaphysical* approach does not disregard the importance of *quantitative data*, nor the importance of *logic*; it simply does not expect more from them than they can offer within the *practical social sciences*<sup>14</sup>. And so, by treating the human being as a being of *ends*, *metaphysics* highlights the idea that the human being is also a teleological being (*final cause*) for whom the exercise of *freedom* is fundamental. More specifically. Whilst ‘modernity’ and, with it, ‘modern’ sociologists, economists, political scientists and jurists have explained *practical-social* relations by equating *efficient* and *final causes* with *selfishness* and, on that basis, have regarded human beings as a ‘machine’ that acts under a single principle, giving rise to ‘selfish’ and “quantitative” models, e.g. that of “coordination” (contractualist) and that of “conflict” (violent); the *metaphysical* approach,

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<sup>12</sup> Feuerbach, L. (1971), pp. 59 and 302; Marx, C., Engels, F. (1968), p. 39; Scheler, M. (1973).

<sup>13</sup> Mises, L., (2009), pp. 70 ff.

<sup>14</sup> The reader will have noticed by now that I am reluctant to refer to Politics, Law or Economics as ‘social sciences’. The term ‘social sciences’ stems, at least in part and since the 17th century, from a certain lack of discernment—and perhaps an absurd complex—on the part of many of those engaged in the study of these disciplines, as compared to the ‘positive sciences’.

let us note, *makes it impossible* to explain human life in society in such a one-sided manner. In this sense, Aristotle quite rightly called metaphysics the “free science” (ἐλευθεῖον ἐπιστήμη)<sup>15</sup>.

A being *that is free in its purposes* does not allow itself to be constrained by any instruction manual. Let us put it in *metaphysical* terms. Before the first *metaphysical division* (*whole-part*) takes place – and before the logical principles of ‘*non-contradiction*’ (coordination) or the dialectical principle of ‘*contradiction*’ (conflict) come into play regarding the consideration of *selfishness* as a defining quality of the human being – the *metaphysical* approach posits a *unified order of ends not limited to selfishness* and, therefore, where *selfishness* is not that it has nothing to say, but rather that it simply says what it actually has to say, and nothing more. In this sense, the *metaphysical approach* leaves the *realm of ends open* to human action, and rejects the *misuse of the positive scientific method* to treat human beings as *vermin* who will be brought to order through *savage competition* or through the *training and domestication* that the State may impose upon them.

Let us be even more specific. Let us look at the period when two of these new positivist ‘*social sciences*’ (Sociology and Economics) came of age. In 1887, Ferdinand Tönnies published *Community and Association*. In that book, he *contrasted* two normative models to account for society, namely the ‘*Gemeinschaft*’ model and the ‘*Gesellschaft*’ model. Meanwhile, in 1920, Max Weber died, leaving his well-known book *Economy and Society*<sup>16</sup> unfinished. In this book, Max Weber identifies two types of human interaction related to the duality of Tönnies’ models; namely, “*Vergemeinschaftung*” and “*Vergesellschaftung*”. Now, these kinds of explanations draw on the notions of “*relationship*”, “*coordination*” and “*type*” to understand and positively assess *human action in a self-interested society* (recall that Max Weber believed *capitalism* had its origins in the Calvinist *belief* that earthly wealth was a sign of salvation<sup>17</sup>). However, set against this kind of explanation stands the ‘*scientific*’ view of ‘*conflict*’, which views social relations in a negative light.

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<sup>15</sup> Aristotle, *Met.*, 982b.

<sup>16</sup> Weber, M., 1978.

<sup>17</sup> Weber, M., 2000.

The most frequently cited and well-known model is that of Engels and Marx<sup>18</sup>. In this model, the State sets itself up as the guardian of human beings in society.

Let's move on. The reality we are dealing with here is that of *'worldview'* and *'ideology'*. The MFI highlights the place occupied by the individual *'narrative'* of the person, the *'group'* and *'society'* regarding the *'world'* within a framework of *reference* and *judgement*. Its mission is not to prejudge the worldviews of individuals, groups or societies. Rather, it seeks to be open to any kind of explanation that may be offered. Now, *narrating* does not merely consist of telling a story consistent with certain principles (analysis: e.g. principles of extension and non-contradiction), but rather th, *complementary, different* and *opposing* narratives are also relevant (conflict: principles of contradiction and dialectics)<sup>19</sup>. The MFI takes this into account.

## B) Etymology and the relationship between *'worldview'* and *'ideology'*

An important term in *'modern'* German philosophy is *'Weltanschauung'*. This term has a tradition that can be traced back to authors such as Scheler, Heidegger, Dilthey, Fichte and Kant, amongst others. In English, it has been translated as *"worldview"*. It refers to one's *"vision of the world"* or *"conception of the world"*. In other words, and here we add our own interpretation, it denotes the set of *beliefs* and *ideas* that dominate a *person, group* or *society* when it comes to understanding their environment and acting within it. It shares a certain conceptual proximity with the word *"paradigm"* and, therefore, also connects with explanations of

<sup>18</sup> Engels, F., (1927), vol. 4, pp. 137ff; Marx, K., (1834), vol. I, 81–94.

<sup>19</sup> The metaphysical principle states that *"what is is not what is not"* (*ens non est non est*). Now, when we make this assertion in a particular way—that is, referring not to the *"entity"* as such but to one reality or another—it follows that what we call *"nothing"* or *"false"* becomes relevant to our assertions about the world. The duality of the MFI takes this circumstance into account. It therefore does not lose its metaphysical character, for, as has been pointed out, the concept of *'nothing'* is necessary to understand absolute being (Millán Puelles, 1990, pp. 183–188).

history through “*paradigmatic*” shifts. In this sense, for example, it would link to the method of the *Nouvelle histoire*, where great importance is attached to the study of *mentalities*<sup>20</sup>. Now, the important thing here is to realise that we would not speak of either “*worldview*” or “*paradigm*” without the distinctive features of the *human being* and *human sociability*, namely *reason*, *will* and *freedom*, which are expressed *socially* through *language* (an element we considered at the time when formalising the MFI). Furthermore, let us note that these *beliefs* and *ideas* relate to the core elements (ultimate *metaphysical* objects) of any *narrative* (*God*, *man* and the *world*). And hence we can speak of the *human being* as a ‘*being of worldviews*’ and, thus, as a ‘*biographical being*’ and a ‘*historical being*’.

Let us now turn to the etymology of the word ‘*ideology*’. It has two meanings. The first relates to *speaking* (λέγω), to expressing one’s *thoughts*. In this sense, its meaning is linked to *language*, that is, to ‘*λογία*’. The second meaning is that of “*είδος*”, that is, *aspect* (language as a *sign*). Well then, these two meanings connect very well with the notion we have said that “*worldview*” has as “*mentality*”. And so, the ‘*worldview*’ would be ‘*that*’ which dominates thought and *justifies* human actions. That ‘*that*’ is not only a *law of judgement* (theoretical or practical) for human action, but, thanks to *freedom* and the fact that man is a being open in his ends, human thought and action can be directed towards ‘*that*’ in order to change it.

How do we establish that *reason* and *freedom* are at the heart of the ‘*worldview*’? We shall use an ontological argument<sup>21</sup>. Neither animals nor God require ‘*worldviews*’ or ‘*ideologies*’, and this is because their *reason* and *freedom* are not like those of humans. The lion’s *conception of the world* is the savannah in which it finds itself. For him, no other “*worldview*” is possible (he is an “*animal of his ecosystem*”). He is “*happy*” where he is, and the possibilities of his actions are intellectually “*adjusted*” by his body and his environment. As for God, He is Happy, and where He “*is*” is perfect

<sup>20</sup> Le Goff, J., in Le Goff, J., - Chartier, R., and Revel, J., (1978), p.78

<sup>21</sup> On the relationship and difference between ontology and metaphysics: Millán Puelles, A., 1972, pp. 80–87.

(Heaven)<sup>22</sup> ; moreover, His work is perfect. Yes, he is free, but *in the simplest sense*, just as he is Happy<sup>23</sup>. Neither for God nor for animals *is life itself an existential problem*<sup>24</sup>. On the contrary, we human beings need to envisage “possible worlds” in which *to live happily*. So we are beings of “worldviews” and, accordingly, we need *to transform the world* in order to *try to be happy in it*. All of this points in a very specific direction when examining human nature. The “possible worlds”, the different “worldviews”, speak to us of a *modal being*, which would be impossible without *reason* and *freedom*. The aspect of human rationality, as an essential characteristic of the human being,<sup>25</sup> cannot be properly understood *in practice* without placing it alongside *freedom* and the *need for happiness*.

That said, what is the difference between a ‘worldview’ and an ‘ideology’? Well, up to this point, we have used the two terms interchangeably without distinguishing between them. A ‘worldview’ clearly refers to *beliefs* and *ideas* about *the ‘world’*; it differs from an ‘ideology’ in that *the latter* makes judgements about the ‘worldview’ of others. In other words, “ideology” refers to a fairly specific aspect of the “worldview” and arises when one “worldview” relates to another. This is a point we have already noted, but we wish to emphasise it: although *opposition* or *antithesis* is the most noticeable aspect of the relationship between “worldviews”, the MFI allows for other possibilities<sup>26</sup>. What interests us is the formalisation of a model that accommodates the *affirmation* and *negation* inherent in each “worldview” and explains the effects it produces in *culture* – we shall examine this term shortly.

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<sup>22</sup> I am using simple and straightforward expressions in theology, but they are no less clear for that.

<sup>23</sup> Bear in mind that we always speak of God imperfectly.

<sup>24</sup> Atticus, C., 2024.

<sup>25</sup> Boethius, III, 1343 AD.

<sup>26</sup> There is an inverse relationship between comprehensiveness and extension. According to this law, the more extensive a concept is, the less comprehensive it is. Example: the concept ‘man’ tells us something much more general and concrete than Don Francisco de Quevedo. Bearing this in mind, it is evident that among ‘worldviews’ there may exist relationships of *equivalence*, *analogy* and, of course, of *difference*, *opposition* and *contradiction* (provided that the two concepts are univocal and neither is inferior to the other) (for further details, see Millán Puelles, 2002, vol. 1, pp. 127 ff.).

### C) Ultimate subjects and objects of the 'worldview' and 'ideology'. The 'strong idea'

What *political theology* and *politics* have in common is the *concept* of 'paradise'. In this, the three ultimate objects of human thought (*God, man* and *the world*) converge in *narrative* resolutions to the problem faced by every human being: *how to be happy*. Now, what the *narratives* of 'worldviews' establish are, ultimately, certain *affirmations* and *negations* regarding human *beliefs* and *ideas* about the protagonists of those *narratives* (*God, man* and *the world*). A *myth* is a *narrative* of this kind<sup>27</sup>; so too is the rational and highly logical language of *scholastic theology* and, of course, the *narrative* that the 'worldview' of the *analytical logicians* we have seen earlier purports to be. One thing can be deduced from all this. The fact that there are so many and such disparate *narratives* with so *few* and *common* elements implies that these are *significantly malleable* and, therefore, *modal* (they proceed, in short, from *the modal being* that is man). And, of course, because this is the case, every 'worldview' can be reduced to a number of very simple *beliefs* and *ideas*; namely, whether *God* exists or not, and if so, whether he is good or not; whether *man* is this or that, good or evil by nature; and, finally, whether the *world* is fine as it is or needs to be transformed. Let us consider how the principle of *non-contradiction* helps to advance the *narrative discourse*. Example: Consider the *account* of the creation of man in *Genesis*: *From a good God it follows (since he cannot be evil nor do anything evil) that man is created 'good' and, therefore, that his actions in paradise are also good (until he succumbs to the serpent's temptation)*. Now let us consider a Marxist 'worldview': *God does not exist; man is selfish; and in society he encounters a capitalist structure designed to appropriate the value of another's labour through the deception of ideology*.

In short, *beliefs* and *ideas* regarding whether *God* exists or not; whether He is good or not (the same applies to humankind); or whether the *world* is beautiful as it is, or whether *humankind*, where applicable, can improve it, are linked in *judgement* to the three

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<sup>27</sup> Kirk, G.S., 2002, p. 39.

metaphysical transcendentals (*Truth, Good and the One*). Thus, in any 'worldview' there are affirmations and negations (grounded in *beliefs* and *ideas*) concerning the three radical objects of human thought, expressed in *narratives*.

And now for something fundamental. The fact that the *beliefs* and *ideas* of 'worldviews' are few and common is linked to the fact that people adhere to them. And so, one of the first things the study of the 'worldview' helps us to understand is that it is not only philosophers or scientists who have 'worldviews'. Not at all. We have said that every person is *biographical*. That is to say, everyone has a 'worldview'; they perceive *the world explained in some way* (reducible to the pattern we have outlined) which, in one way or another, they translate into their lives. Certainly, the philosopher may present a more complete, justified and sophisticated 'worldview', but, we insist, there is no person who comes into this world who does not have a judgement and reasons concerning *God, man* and the *world* in relation to the transcendentals of 'truth', 'good' and 'one' through a *narrative*. We have yet to meet a person who, when asked if they are happy, fails to reply with a story in which those three elements play a part. And what we are saying here is fundamental, for it is thus that we realise, firstly, that there can be 'worldviews' that are highly sophisticated and, at the same time, radically false and perverse (e.g. Marx, Heidegger, Sartre, etc.). And, conversely, that there can be 'worldviews' that are less sophisticated yet certainly truer and better. Put another way, Marx's 'ignorant' rabbi grandfather was closer to the truth and the good than his grandson (the social scientist). In short, it is radically false to assume that more sophisticated knowledge necessarily implies a better understanding of the human world.

A fundamental point follows from what we have said. Namely, that however sophisticated a 'worldview' may be, it will always boil down to a series of very simple *beliefs* and *ideas*, which, let us note, are what bring people together in groups. Example: The vast majority of socialists and liberals will die without having read a single page of Marx's *\*Capital\** or Rothbard's *\*The Ethics of Liberty\** and, naturally, without understanding what terms such as 'social justice', 'freedom' or 'progress' mean within their 'worldviews'. A 'worldview', in short, justifies *people's actions* without requiring them to give a full account of everything they *believe* and *know*. In this phenomenon

there is a rather surprising *economic law of thought*; that which means that so little manages to explain so much to so many. In this sense, we say that the basic *beliefs* and *ideas* of the ‘*worldview*’ are generally *simple* and *strong*.

## II. ELEMENTS OF THE ‘WORLDVIEW’

*Believing* and *knowing*, *absolving* and *condemning*, shape human attitudes towards *truth*, *goodness* and *unity* in the *world* through *narratives*. This is why we live through *beliefs* and *ideas*, *laws* and *fashions*. As we explained earlier, neither God nor animals need to *believe*, nor do they need *laws* like ours, nor do they need *fashions*. Now, that being the case, the fundamental question is *why*. We have already pointed to the solution to this question, namely, *the need to find a way to be happy*. And the fact is, of course, that neither God nor animals need to seek out different paths, new worlds, or rebuild the ‘*world*’—in short, to do any of the things we humans do in an attempt to be happy. In this sense, ‘*worldview*’ and ‘*ideology*’ pertain to the way in which man ‘*exists in the world*’, ‘*adapting*’ through *time* and *space* driven by the impulse *to be happy*<sup>28</sup>. Let us examine this more closely: why does the human being require a *worldview* to carry on with life?

### A) The dissatisfied nature of human beings in the world

If humankind did not live in a state of constant *dissatisfaction* regarding its desire for happiness, there would be no ‘*worldviews*’ or ‘*ideologies*’. These exist as concrete attempts to achieve *happiness*. And let us consider this: the only being that possesses *qualities* (virtues) which lead it *towards the future* with a focus on *happiness* is humankind. Is man not the only being capable of *faith*, *hope* and *love*? If you prefer, by virtue of these three virtues, we are the only *religious*,

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<sup>28</sup> On the existential notion of ‘*adjustment*’, see Atticus, C., (2024).

*creative* and *political* beings on Earth<sup>29</sup>. And this is key, because we then realise that *faith*, *hope* and *love* are essential for directing *freedom* towards *future happiness*. From this point, we can understand the enormous importance that the '*promise*' can hold for human beings. Messiahs *promise*, politicians *promise*, the leaders of any organisation *promise*, parents *promise* their children, traders *promise* their customers, and so on. And what is it that is *promised*? That which is capable of filling human *faith* and *hope* with meaning; generally speaking: '*paradises*'. Hence the fact that every *promise* entails a *happy explanation of the world*. This *happy explanation of the world* has its downside. For *punishment* is also *promised*. And so, we *existentially* uncover the utilitarian rule governing human action; the one that states that man acts to seek good and avoid evil.

The significance of the '*promise*' does not merely highlight the importance of *belief* and *hope* for *human happiness*. It also points to the enormous importance of *love* (acceptance versus rejection). Moreover, it indicates the primacy of *love* over *reason* when it comes to human beings interpreting the '*world*'. Indeed, for any *promise* that did not seek man's adherence to a good (whether positively or by avoiding an evil) would be meaningless. This confirms that the *dissatisfied being* (man) *wishes to believe* and *know* what he needs in order to '*adapt*' *happily to the world*. We know and explain the *world* according to what *we require* to be *completely happy*. Thus, it is the *heart* that guides our reason in constructing '*worldviews*' and *narratives* about the world. We cannot dwell on this point. What is important for our subject is to point out that the primacy of *love* explains the *unifying* and *conflictual* nature with which, for example, Max Scheler characterises *ideologies*<sup>30</sup>.

## B) The philosophy of suspicion and ideologies

One of the distinctive features of Western philosophy is that it has developed out of a search for solutions to the existential state of

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<sup>29</sup> Spinoza, B., (1976), preface; Donoso Cortés, J., (2003), pp. 95 ff.; on the '*modern*' replacement of religion by politics: Matz, U., in Utz, A.F., (1989), p. 56.

<sup>30</sup> Scheler, M., (1993).

'*dissatisfaction*' experienced by human beings. This is what has given it its distinctive character as a '*philosophy of suspicion*'. *Western culture* is not resigned – as most Eastern cultures were – nor is it less rationally developed than what we see in other cultures. It does not give up on achieving *paradise* in this world, nor does it want this to deprive it of the possibility of accessing a *blissful after-life*. It *wants* it all. If he is not happy in this or that situation, Western man has always considered that *God* and/or *man* and/or the *world* must have another story to tell. The God of the Jews is not the Christian Triune God; the Greek man is not like the Roman, nor is the Roman of the Republic like the Roman of the 4th century AD; nor is Renaissance *culture* like industrial culture, and so on. Such a radical and paradigm-shifting change cannot be understood without a state of continuous '*suspicion*' regarding the state of affairs, of the '*world*'.

The fact that '*suspicion*' places human beings in a *state of 'doubt'* when faced with the '*world*' has very specific consequences. The person who views the world with '*suspicion*' employs *dichotomies* that compel them to engage in rational discernment. Is it true or not? Is it good or not? And so, Greek metaphysics, for example, arose out of doubt regarding the mythical anthropomorphisms of divinity; and this entailed nothing less than a revolutionary atheism, namely that of Xenophanes when he stated that the abstract "*One*" was a property of divinity, in contrast to the multiplicity of the gods in Greek myths. The *duality* of the '*one*' and the '*many*' had just emerged through a judgement on '*truth*' and '*good*'. For his part, Parmenides would refer to the '*two paths*' concerning *Being*, demonstrating, once again, that discernment operates between '*truth*' and '*falsehood*'. And the '*divine*' Plato would divide the world into the *apparent* and the *real*. How could these ideas fail to fit with those of the Jewish religion?! In it, truth, the '*One*', God, was distinguished from the '*many*', that is, from *idolatry*. But was Judaism a religion of "*suspicion*"? Naturally. It is nothing more and nothing less than the religion that dares to argue about the justice of God. In the Book of *Job*, for example, we are told the story (narrative) of the man who wants to take God to court for the injustice he is suffering. In the Wisdom Books, too, discernment regarding doubt is key. The word (דַּעְוָה), for example,

is used in *Prov.* 3:6 to signify the recognition of God as the way to be in the truth, *being suspicious* of actions that rely on one's own understanding (השען אל-בינהך) – *Prov.* 3:5. And so, anything that may be deceptive and before which man may end up kneeling<sup>31</sup> will be *an idol, idolatry*. This current, naturally, will be taken up by Christianity. From the most ancient texts, the idea of the 'two paths' (*Didache*) appears clearly.

To put it in more "modern" terms—as we have explained elsewhere<sup>32</sup> and also above—the word "ideology" in the Modern Age came to be understood as a general "suspicion" regarding the "world beyond" (metaphysical suspicion). And so, the major categories of "suspicion" in "modern" Western thought regarding the "world" will be: "phenomenon" and "noumenon"; "one" or "many". As for the "modern" categories of suspicion regarding the good, these will be: "morality" (One) and "legality" (multiple).

In accordance with this series of ideas, the linear view of historical time (not the circular one) is also Western; on the timeline, the *historical sense* of contrasts and of words such as "transformation", "progress" or "maturation" is possible. And so, in the West we have treated history as a plan brought about by the providence of God,<sup>33</sup> as the maturation of reason<sup>34</sup> or as technical progress. In all these cases, we are told, in different ways, of a history always in a 'linear process'. A process towards where? The one indicated by the *promise*, that is, that of the 'worldviews'. According to the archetypes we have just used: towards a *future of eschatological, rational or technical happiness*.

We now have all the key elements needed to understand the 'worldview', the 'ideology' and the MFI that we have proposed. By now, the reader will have realised that, for us, *the term 'ideology'* does not carry a pejorative connotation in itself. Rather, whether any 'worldview' is good or bad is something that is determined by the debate itself and, naturally, by its outcomes<sup>35</sup>.

<sup>31</sup> Fromm, E., (1964), p.55.

<sup>32</sup> Atticus, C., 2 (2024).

<sup>33</sup> St Augustine, *De civit. Dei*.

<sup>34</sup> Hegel, G.W.F., (2016).

<sup>35</sup> Scheler, M., (2010); Van Dijk, T. (1998), p. 178; Ricoeur, P., (1999), p. 5.

### C) Truth and the world explained

Human beings have no choice but to “*make themselves*” and, in “*making themselves*”, to transform the “*world*” in an attempt to be happy. Conceiving of “*paradises*”, filling the future with promises, acting under the dictates of *faith* and *hope* to adhere to a good or goods are conditions of strictly human action. Buddhism, Hinduism, Taoism, jungle tribes of whatever kind, etc., have not reaped the benefits that the West has derived from the virtues of *faith*, *hope* and *love*; simply because many of these “*worldviews*” treat *desire*—and, with it, *love*—as the cause of human suffering in the world and attempt to suppress desire or, quite simply, resign themselves to it despite their dissatisfaction.

That is why *belief* is so important in Western thought. On the one hand, it propels human beings towards a *promising future*. But, let us note, it does so by making up for what *we do not know*<sup>36</sup>. That is to say, given that we can never expect an objective truth regarding all the aspects that would give rise to an *objective narrative of our happy life*, we must necessarily *believe* at least in a ‘*narrative of a possibly happy world*’ that propels us towards the future.

Well then, it is now that we can introduce two key principles for understanding the relationship between *ideas* and *beliefs* (which are considered in the MFI):

- a) All knowledge is ‘revelabile’. – That is to say, it contains a set of categories and principles that give rise to *beliefs*. ‘*Revelabile*’ is not ‘*revelatum*’. ‘*Revelatum*’ is that whose essence is to be revealed; ‘*revelabile*’ is that which *belief* brings in its wake: certain *ideas*. An example will clarify this better. *Belief* in science resulted, in the case of the socialist “*worldview*”, in the promise

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<sup>36</sup> “This fundamental law holds true: every finite spirit either believes in God or in an *idol*” (Scheler, M., (2007), p. 222). In relation to politics: “It is not, therefore, science, as Comte believes, which has displaced institutional metaphysics of forms and essences, but politics that has done so on a grand *scale*” (Scheler, M., (1973), p.215). “*Belief*” is grounded in a human *capacity* (*Glauben-können*), which makes it possible for one to believe (*Glauben-dürfen*), leading in many ways to the identification of “*duties*” with “*beliefs*”; that is, that *one must believe* (*Glauben-müssen*) in something.

of a *perfect world* through an explanation that utilised the apparatus of “*atomic science*”<sup>37</sup>.

- b) One cannot believe and know the same thing at the same time and in the same respect. – When we know something through *ideas*, *belief* is displaced from that space. But, let us note, we do not cease to *believe*. Simply put, the human being’s dissatisfaction remains in the new situation, so that our *beliefs* come to consider other goods and sources from which to obtain an ‘*explained world*’. In this sense, as the Good possesses a perfection impossible in any human situation, man is always compelled to be *transcendental*. Here, being *transcendental* does not mean believing in God (though that too), but rather that one is *transcendental* from the very moment one seeks goods other than those one already enjoys in one’s present state. Thus, the *belief* that accumulating all possible goods may lead to happiness is a way of demonstrating *transcendence*. In this case, for the person in the example, the sum of all possible goods equals one.

These two principles are fundamental; we might think that, since we are not omniscient, human beings move through a world they do not know. This is exactly the case; however, that unknown world is, precisely through the relationship between *beliefs* and *ideas*, *explained*. In short, the ontological and epistemological condition of human beings demands *that they believe and know* in order to *be happy*, and that, precisely that, is what makes them beings of ‘*worldviews*’.

#### D) Truth, belief and ‘worldview’

Therefore, having understood the origin of ‘*worldviews*’, their characteristic epistemological elements, their role in justifying human action and, finally, having explained the particular role they have played in the West, we can now attempt to classify the fundamental types of ‘*worldviews*’ that have emerged in *Western culture*:

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<sup>37</sup> Atticus, C., (in press).

- a) The 'worldview' is equivalent to truth. –For St Augustine, for example, the truth of human and natural reality is linked to *belief* in the Christian God<sup>38</sup>. In other words, *belief* and *truth* work together to provide a comprehensive view of the 'order' of the world. In this case, *philosophy* and *science* occupy a different place from that of *theology*; however, insofar as there is no room for contradiction in God, there exists among all these disciplines an *order* of knowledge that follows the *ontological order* of reality (*sic enim est dispositio rerum in veritate sicut in esse*). To put it another way, *belief* and *reason* have distinct yet related sources of truth. In this case, what is *false* is any *idea* or *belief* that departs from that 'order'. *Radical anthropomorphisms*<sup>39</sup> and also *radical historical pantheisms*<sup>40</sup> (each placing the emphasis on man or on the world) follow the same pattern.
- b) The 'worldview' produces truth. - Human beings have no more resources with which to seek the *truth* than those found within the 'worldview' – into which they are born and within which they develop. This is the view, for example, of Dilthey<sup>41</sup> and Karl Mannheim<sup>42</sup>. This perspective leads to a certain *relativism*, for, as is easy to see, it serves to leave many aspects relating to *beliefs* in the hands of *politics*. *Truth* and *goodness* depend on the temporal and social context in which one lives and seeks to be happy.
- c) The 'worldview' is the pinnacle of truth. – This orientation would synthesise the orientations of (a) and (b). Authors of this school might include, for example, Hegel or, in a certain sense, some authors who revised Hegelian dialectics, such as Kierkegaard<sup>43</sup> or Rickert<sup>44</sup>. Kierkegaard's *dialectic* and Rickert's notion of '*heterothesis*' similarly refer to dual

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<sup>38</sup> St Augustine, 16,34.

<sup>39</sup> "Man is the measure of all things" (Protagoras) – see Plato, *Cratylus*, 385e.

<sup>40</sup> Hegel, GWF., (20), p. 166.

<sup>41</sup> Dilthey, W., (1945), p. 115.

<sup>42</sup> Mannheim, K., (1957).

<sup>43</sup> Kierkegaard, S., VII, A124.

<sup>44</sup> Rickert, H., (1925).

concepts that make sense when considered together<sup>45</sup>. The fundamental difference from Hegelian dialectics is that those of Kierkegaard or Rickert are not resolute and, in them—especially in Kierkegaard—*Christian belief* occupies a central place. In any case, the factor of *time* is fundamental in these frameworks.

- d) The “worldview” relates to truth relatively. – This is the proposition of Husserl’s *Phenomenology*, which extends to Heidegger’s existentialism or H.G. Gadamer’s hermeneutics. This approach transforms the human being’s position in the world into *interpretation*.

We can classify the above models *metaphysically* according to the importance attached to *the ‘one’* or the *‘many’* in their formulation. All of them oscillate between truth as a transcendental absolute (the One) and truth as variability (the many). In any case, it seems clear that, taken together, none of them denies the unsatisfied position of the human being in the world. Kierkegaard will refer us to the *“anxiety”* arising from the lack of clarity in the modern *“worldview”*,<sup>46</sup> linking our era to the *“restlessness”* of St Augustine’s heart<sup>47</sup> (the author with whom we began our classification).

### E) Undoing Mannheim’s paradox

In short, we must discard the *“modern”* prejudice that all *“ideology”* is a falsehood. This is not necessarily true. Some *beliefs* are truer than others, and some *beliefs* are false. That is to say, *“worldviews”* and their *“ideological”* relationship can account for *“truth”*, *“good”* and *“the one”* in a more or less accurate manner. It will therefore be the result of the analysis of each *‘worldview’* that allows us to make *judgements*. In fact, the *ideological* struggle (to succeed in establishing a *‘worldview’*) exists for the reasons we are explaining. This resolves Mannheim’s paradox, which asks: How can we escape

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<sup>45</sup> Rickert, H., (1925), p. 23.

<sup>46</sup> Kierkegaard, S., (2013).

<sup>47</sup> St Augustine, *Conf.* I, 1.

*ideology* if it also determines our way of seeing the world?<sup>48</sup> Simple: we do not need to escape anywhere (because we are beings of ‘worldviews’); we simply need to ensure that our ‘worldview’ is as true as possible in terms of *beliefs* and *ideas*.

We are now in a position to take a further step towards the concrete. Let us descend from the ‘*metaphysical*’ to the ‘*social*’.

### III. MAN AND SOCIETY

The ‘*human being in the world*’ is not like any other living being in its *ecosystem*. Nor is the ‘*human being in society*’ like an *animal with its herd*. In this sense, as we have said, ‘*worldview*’ and ‘*ideology*’ relate to the distinctive nature of the ‘*human being in the world*’ and the ‘*human being in society*’. We can consider these singularities under a single aspect: the “*cultural*” (a *biography*, the *history* of a society, is the *narrative* of a *culture*). From a *metaphysical* perspective, the *transcendentals*, *categories*, *predicates* and *post-predicates* are realised in the “*cultural*”. This relationship of ideas is *existential*<sup>49</sup>. It is present in the life of every person. Every human being is born into a ‘*culture*’; from there, they resolve the problem of happiness by necessarily ‘*turning*’ towards the ‘*cultural*’. They are born *metaphysically* prepared to make the ‘*turn*’ – if I may use the expression –; that is to say, the metaphysical structure is waiting to be completed by the ‘*cultural*’ and the discernment exercised by the individual.

Very important. The *need for culture* is not at odds with the *need for individual freedom*. Nor are we falling into an oxymoron by speaking of both *necessity* and *freedom* at the same time. These are fairly common errors made by those who deny *individual freedom* on the grounds that it is necessarily determined by ‘*external*’ or ‘*internal*’ factors (e.g. social determinism,<sup>50</sup> genetic selfishness,<sup>51</sup>

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<sup>48</sup> Mannheim, K., (1995), p. 41.

<sup>49</sup> Nor is the metaphysical debate over whether existence is imbued in the *act of being* or not relevant here.

<sup>50</sup> ‘Behaviourism’ (John B. Watson and Burrhus F. Skinner).

<sup>51</sup> Dawkins, R., 1976

etc.) and, we would also argue, can lead to the mistake of considering that *freedom* means being open to an infinite number of possibilities in concrete action<sup>52</sup>. Human beings *are necessarily 'shaped'* by the '*cultural*', yes, but that does not mean that this '*shaping*' lacks *options* and, therefore, *free individual decisions*; nor, of course, can this be taken to the extreme of thinking that human beings, in their *freedom*, have every conceivable possibility open to them. Let us examine this, as it is essential for understanding human life in society and, of course, for grasping the '*worldview*' as the foundation of all *practical-social disciplines*.

### A) The individual and the social.

A person has to learn practically everything from their environment<sup>53</sup>: which language to speak, the physical and political map of the world they are entering, the values of their society and family, and so on. However, the extent to which a person is satisfied with their life, their character, the resources at their disposal, and so on, will determine whether their '*perspective*' is more or less *critical* of '*culture*'. Language is a very good example to explain this better. We are educated through it and, in doing so, we are imparted a certain '*worldview*' of the people who use it. None of the people who use the language can claim to be its creator, nor, in most cases, of many of the *beliefs* and *ideas* it conveys. However, the specific outcome, when using the same language, is very different and, ultimately, conveys different individual '*worldviews*'. Example: Now that a certain strand of feminism insists that the correct approach is to use both masculine and feminine forms in every sentence, in our case we make greater use than ever of the masculine form as a comprehensive term for both genders. Thus, the reader will have noticed that we have been using the term '*man*' in this sense. In other words, in this case, our '*twist*' on the language is *critical*.

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<sup>52</sup> Sartre, J-P, 1943, p.516.

<sup>53</sup> The explanation of human epistemology through the relationship between the "patient" and the "agent" (e.g. Aristotle, *De anima*, III, 4, 429a 15–16; St Thomas, I, 79, 3, ad 1m) presupposes this characteristic of the human being.

This brings us to the heart of the *practical-social disciplines*, namely, the clarification of the 'individual' and the 'social'. These two concepts correspond to one of the earliest formal divisions of 'being' in *metaphysics*; we have already mentioned it: 'the whole' and 'the part'. Thus, the ideas of *society* as the sum of individuals or, where applicable, as an 'entity', share the notion of *totality*. For this reason, Professor Juan Cruz Cruz teaches us that the sum of individuals has been called "πᾶν" in Greek, "omne" in Latin and "Gesamtheit" in German; whilst "totality" as such has been designated in those languages as "ἅπλοῦς", "totum", "Gesamtheit" and "54 ". Now, in both cases, we are speaking of a certain "whole" being "one". Hence, for example, Aristotle treated the *whole* as a container of certain things insofar as these "are one"<sup>55</sup>.

The distinction is made through the *predicates*; in the case of 'worldviews' in their *practical-social* dimension, this involves viewing the subjects of the narrative and the world in a particular way. More specifically, by focusing on the "human" predicate (*substance*),<sup>56</sup> addressing the *essence* of the "human" from the perspective of *individuality* or *sociability*<sup>57</sup> and, thus, giving rise to two different types of subjects (the *individual* and *society*), to which the remaining

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<sup>54</sup> Cruz Cruz, J., 1974, p.189.

<sup>55</sup> Aristotle, *Met.*, V, 26, 1023b 27.

<sup>56</sup> We are using the term 'substance' in the sense of 'οὐσία', that is, in contrast to 'γινόμενον' (becoming), in the sense used by Plato in the *Sophist*, 247b. This coincides, at least in part, with St Augustine's use of the word "essentia" (St Augustine, *Ep.* 118, 15). However, we note that the concept of "essence" may not coincide with that of "substance". For example, we can speak of the "essence" of justice or love, but not of their "substance" (since they do not refer to a real entity). As far as we are concerned here, what is said of the human being will be what serves to determine it in the predicative relationship: *genus*, *species*, *difference*, *property* and *accident*.

<sup>57</sup> Although the logical difference between "common" and "collective" names is far-reaching when it comes to establishing "sets", it is very important to understand the relationship between the *denotative* and *connotative* functions of language and the *will*, and therefore the power to form sets. Let us consider a group of people; we can bring them together on the basis of something we perceive in all of them, for example, 'being rational', and, from there, begin to study the 'group' according to the principles we deduce from the property of 'being rational'. Now, we could also say that only those who are 'supportive' are 'rational' (e.g. Socialism). That is to say, to ascribe a characteristic to them in a general way and, from there, also deduce principles for studying the 'group'. In this case, it is the 'will' to extend a general judgement about the 'group' that will lead us to one set of principles or another.

categories will be applied (e.g. *action, passion, quality, relationship*, etc.) and the judgement made through the *transcendentals*. All of this will be realised in the *cultural* sphere. Hence, the *biographical narrative*, that of the *group* and *society*.

In the *'turn'*, therefore, we can understand how *general* and *concrete* judgements operate. The *metaphysical judgement* seeks the *subject* about which *to make a statement* and *pass judgement*. And, of course, let us note that the judgement is a composition of concepts as if they were one<sup>58</sup>. And so, in the *practical and social disciplines*, the duality of *'individual'* and/or *'society'* is fundamental<sup>59</sup>. Thus, in that first metaphysical determination, the *judgement is abstract* (theoretical and practical). That is to say, depending on whether the *'individual'* and/or *'society'* is *'true'* and/or *'false'*, *'good'* and/or *'bad'*,

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
<sup>58</sup> Aristotle, *De anima*, III, 6, 430a–27.

<sup>59</sup> It is very important to note that there is a holistic relationship between the *'individual'* and *'society'* through *addition* (society as the sum of individuals), whilst there is an *abstract relationship* between *'society'* as an *'entity'* and the individuals who make it up. In this case, the concept of *'social'* is derived by *subtraction* (by removing from the individuals that which is distinctive). In the first case (society as the sum of individuals), the *'common good'* is concrete, that is to say, it is derived from the types of individual relationships that may exist within society. In the second case, that is, that of *'society'* as an *'entity'*, the *'common good'* is derived through the very same process of abstraction of society as an *'entity'*. This phenomenon is of enormous importance. Whilst in the first case (society as the sum of individuals) reality is what imposes itself on any rationalisation of society, in the second (society as an *'entity'*) whoever performs the abstraction will be the one to determine what the *'common good'* is and, therefore, what, for example, is *just*. We may ask whether *'society'* understood in a subtractive manner is a *'part'* of the *'whole'* – which would be society understood as a sum. The answer is as follows. Both are *special ways* of understanding the same subject matter: *'society'*. That is to say, in each case, one cannot predicated the abstract from the concrete; such an operation would make as much sense as saying in each instance that *'whiteness is white'*. Now, from the consideration of *'society'* in an additive, real sense, concrete abstractive operations controlled by reality can be derived, as when we understand *'good'* after examining various *'good'* things; on the other hand, this changes when we start from *"good"* to judge (and *state*) that this or that is *"good"*, as, for example, when we consider it *"good"* that sex is a matter of opinion. In this case, I impose this judgement on an irrefutable chromosomal reality that divides the species into males and females. And now a key point: why is it possible to use quantification in both versions of *'society'*? Simple: because the quantitative is extensive and, of course, is divisible regardless of what it may refer to in reality. Metaphysically, it is said that the only exception to which it is possible to apply categorical abstracts to categorical concretes is extensive quantity (Millán Puelles, 2002, vol. 1, p. 141).

'One' and/or 'multiple'. But this is not enough. The *abstrac y of the judgement* is waiting to be informed more concretely by the "cultural" (*God in culture and for me, man in culture and for me, the world in culture and for me*). All of this forms the operation of the "world-view" through the dynamic notion of "turn".

Now, in the MFI, the issue is not a choice between an *individualist* or a *collectivist* stance. We do have that, of course, but it is not the point in the MFI. As we have said, the 'whole' and the 'part', the 'individual' and the 'social' are conditions of the 'turn' in human life through 'culture' in order to 'adjust' happily to the 'world'. In this sense, the MFI accommodates all possibilities (the sum of individuals and society as an 'entity').

And God? Is He not a relevant Subject in the social sphere? Of course He is. But His prominence in the *narratives* is determined by His role in resolving the problem of *human dissatisfaction*. God does not need human beings to be happy; human beings may or may not need God. In this sense, both the 'worldviews' that include Him and those that do not become part of the MFI.



## B) Values and "worldview"

We have drawn attention to the fact that human beings know what *they wish to know*. In other words, human beings do not know just anything, but rather that towards which they feel an inclination. In a way, this is a consequence of something we have already noted: knowledge is directed towards resolving the problems posed by *human happiness*. Does this mean that our knowledge is always *utilitarian*? Yes. Is theoretical metaphysical knowledge utilitarian<sup>60</sup>? Well, yes, and here we part ways with

<sup>60</sup> Cf. Millán Puelles, A., 1972, p.33.

the general idea that metaphysics is essentially a theoretical discipline. Let us note that, on the one hand, the epistemology derived from metaphysics establishes the conditions under which knowledge and problem-solving occur and, on the other hand, ultimately, it is obvious that when *we wish* to know about 'Being', we are driven by the desire to know what it is that will completely satisfy our desire for happiness. In this sense, St Augustine will say that this is the radical impulse of the human heart<sup>61</sup> and, consequently, that "*no one is well if they can be better*"<sup>62</sup>. So, indeed, *utilitarian judgement* has a very concrete *real* dimension in every human being, namely, that of attaining the *fullness* of "truth" and "good"<sup>63</sup>. This full explanatory meaning coincides with the fact that, necessarily, whatever the human being, *they create* at the same time as *they know*, in order to have the *world explained* and to be able to envisage "*paradises*" in which the *desire for happiness is fulfilled*.

Now, one might ask: what does *utility* have to do with '*values*'? Well, everything, after all; human beings devise their strategies for happiness based on what they consider best for their own happiness. The means that St Francis of Assisi employed in his life to be happy are very different from those employed by Henry Ford. That said, we must devote a few words to the *Philosophy of Values*. The reason for this is that it sought to establish, in concrete terms, an *objective* and *permanent scale of values*<sup>64</sup>. And, in this sense, it is relevant for an MFI whether or not this has been achieved. The answer is no. The truth is that the original aim of the *Philosophy of Values* to overturn Kantian formal ethics and, at the same time, supplant a *theological axiology* has failed. In fact, the boldest attempt to objectify the human system of preferences has not come from the authors usually cited when discussing the *Philosophy of Values*, but from marginalist economists. And let us note that these economists have had no choice but to restrict and limit their value judgement to the satisfaction of a single class of

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<sup>61</sup> St Augustine, *Conf.* I, 1.

<sup>62</sup> St Augustine, *De vera religio*, XLI, 78.

<sup>63</sup> St Anselm, VI, col. 153 A.

<sup>64</sup> Scheler, M., (2001).

good—<sup>65</sup>—using the *'ceteris paribus'* rule. That is to say, they recognise that where two or more goods exist, it is impossible to establish an objective system of preferences. However, for us, the aim is to identify the basic patterns upon which any estimation is built, so as to account for them in the MFI. Well, there are basically two. Following the classification we made earlier, at one pole we have the one that treats *'truth'* and *'good'* as *'one'*. We shall call this *the 'vertical' one*. In which *'goods'* (values) participate in *the 'Good'*. The second, which corresponds to the relativist models we have explained, we shall call *'horizontal'*, since in these no superior *'Good'* is identified from which the rest derive and to which they are subordinate. In the first, as we can see, the metaphysical idea of *"unity"* and ontological and axiological hierarchy takes precedence; in the second, importance is given to axiological and ontological *"variability"*. The reader will note that we have linked *"ontology"* with *"axiology"*. Well then, in the MFI we have incorporated both *vertical* and *horizontal* axiological patterns.

### C) Implications for the social sciences

Everything we have said so far is relevant to the *practical social sciences*. We do not care in the slightest how many divisions and subdivisions *specialists* make within them. Nor do we mind if they intermingle by transferring methods from one to another (e.g. Economic Analysis of Law, Sociology of Law, etc.). Ultimately, as we have explained, they all depend on *the 'individual'* or *'collective'* approach and on the *principles* and *values* derived from whichever approach is adopted. Let us explain. If we take the *'individual subject'* as our starting point and wish to understand what is *'social'*, we will necessarily arrive at *the 'social subject'* as a *'collection of individuals'* and, *consequently* and *necessarily*, we will use the principle of *the 'coordination'* of *individual action* as the unifying factor bringing together the various *'subjects'* within *'society'*. In this sense,

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<sup>65</sup> Menger, C., (2019).

the 'values' of *personal freedom, private property, the right to privacy, etc.*, will be those that come to illustrate this kind of 'worldview'. In the other case—by speaking—if we consider society as an 'entity' to be the 'social subject', the 'collective' becomes key. And so, the risk of this approach lies in the differential (the *individual*), such that the *principle of 'conflict'* between people will also be affirmed, *necessarily and consequently*. Consequently, it will be the 'values' of *security, solidarity, equality, etc.*, that are favoured by this kind of explanation.

And so, is *socialism* not a 'worldview' that elevates the 'social' dimension above the 'individual' (the 'social' as something distinct from *individuals*)? Is *liberalism*, by contrast, not a 'worldview' that emphasises the 'individual' over the 'social' (*society as the sum of individuals*)? And as for principles, does *liberalism* not emphasise the principle of social 'coordination' over that of 'conflict'? And, for its part, does *socialism* not assume that 'conflict' takes precedence over social 'coordination'? In practical terms, does *liberalism* not assume that the exercise of freedom by individuals will lead to the most positive or beneficial outcome (*the greatest good for the greatest number*<sup>66</sup>)? And, for its part, does *socialism* not assume that the rationalisation and security of society will result in a utopian outcome (all good for all)? Let us be clear: the *balanced* contrast we have drawn between *liberalism* and *socialism* as 'ideologies' is merely illustrative. Obviously, in this case, neither *ideology* shares the same basis for 'truth' and 'good' in their *beliefs* and *ideas*. *Socialism* is a degeneration of *liberalism* and, as such, delves into all *liberal* errors and exacerbates them to the point – as Juan Donoso Cortés put it – of evil<sup>67</sup>. But this is not our subject at present. What is fundamental for us is to point out that, just as with language, *individual* and *social* action are relevant factors in accounting for 'worldview' and 'ideology'. Furthermore, when we take these into account, the two principles upon which all *practical-social disciplines* are based immediately become apparent: namely, *coordination* and *conflict*. The following table summarises what has been said so far.

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<sup>66</sup> Bentham, J., (1987), p. 28

<sup>67</sup> Donoso Cortés, J., (2003), Book II, Chapter 9; Book III, Chapter 4.

<i>Metaphysics</i>	<i>Object</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Social</i>	<i>Principles</i>
Good-Truth	Man	Individual	Sum of individuals	Coordination
Evil-Truth	Man	Society	Society as an 'entity'	Conflict

We can relate all the *practical social* disciplines to the above framework. That is to say, for example, a lawyer who is familiar with the ideas we have just presented is knowledgeable about all the *practical social disciplines*, even if they have never specifically studied Politics, Sociology or Economics. They simply need to be consistent with the approach and principles derived from the framework they have adopted when studying law; from there, the difference lies in the use of different terms or types of language. This is easily understood when we observe that all these disciplines are now based on politics, e.g. political economy, political law, political sociology, etc.

<i>Ideas/categories</i>	<i>Principle of coordination</i>	<i>Principle of conflict</i>	<i>Disciplines</i>
<b>Happiness</b>	Happiness as an individual possibility. (Free will)	Happiness as a collective possibility. (Security)	<b>Philosophical anthropology. Ethics.</b>
<b>Legitimacy of power</b>	Theory of the conditional social contract. Right to rebellion.	Theory of the irrevocable social contract. Coercion and political power.	<b>Politics</b>
<b>Social action</b>	<sup>68</sup> r spontaneous validity	Collective validity	<b>Sociology</b>
<b>Norm</b>	Spontaneous: custom	Directed: Positive norm	<b>Law</b>
<b>Economic order</b>	Spontaneous	Directed	<b>Economics</b>

And so, following these same ideas, we can classify various authors within some of these disciplines:

<sup>68</sup> The term "*vigencia*" is taken from Ortega y Gasset.

<i>Principles Disciplines</i>	<i>Principle of coordination</i>	<i>Eclecticism</i>	<i>Principle of conflict</i>
<b>Politics</b>	Aristotle / John Locke / Hume / Montesquieu / Lord Acton / M. Huemer / K. Popper / H. Spencer / J. Huerta de Soto, etc.	St Thomas Aquinas / W. Dikthey / J. Finnis / A. Kaufmann / F. Fukuyama / A. Millán Puelles / L. Recasens Siches / E. Díaz de Tejada / J.B. Vallet de Goytisolo, etc.	Luther / F. de Vitoria / Th. Hobbes / B. Gracián / G. Ockham / / Machiavelli / I. Kant / J.J. Rousseau / F. Hegel / La Mettrie / M. Edelman / H. Heller / H. Jellinek / J. Rawls, etc.
<b>Sociology</b>	G. Tarde / G. Simmel / H. Spencer / W. Mills, etc.	Max Weber / H. Bergson / J. Ortega y Gasset / J. Marías / M. Blondel / A. Humboldt / T. Parsons / F. Tönnies, etc.	A. Comte / E. Durkheim / Th. Arnold F. Bacon / F. Chodorov / F. Engels / E. Ehrlich / G. Vico / La Mettrie / A. Guiden / S. Hartmann / S. Sprenger, etc
<b>Law</b>	Cicero / R. Ihering / G. Radbruch / O.W. Holmes / M. Corte / J. Huerta de Soto / P.H. Proudhon / F.K. Savigny / B. Windscheid / C. Schmitt, etc.	Luis de Molina / E. Bolch / J. Castán Tobeñas / F. de Castro F. Clemente de Diego / J. Costa / A. Kaufmann / K. Larenz J.B. Vallet de Goytisolo, etc.	Hans Kelsen / N. Bobbio / E. Cicubali / L. Duguit / M. Hauriu / F. Hegel / G. Jakobs / J.H. Kirschmann / R. Posner / J. Rawls, etc.
<b>Economics</b>	Xenophon/R. Cantillon/C. Menger/E. Böhm-Bawerk/L. von Mises/R.W. Garrison M. Rothbard/J. Huerta de Soto, etc.	Max Weber/W. Eucken/ F. Hayek, etc.	Adam Smith/ J.B. Say/D. Ricardo. John S. Mill/R.H. Coase/Eugen Eucken/I. Fisher/G.F. Knapp/ W. Pareto/A.C. Pigou/F. Engels/K. Marx/ John M. Keynes/M. Friedman/ P. Samuelson/J. Tirole T. Piketty, etc.

IV.  
SOCIETY AS A 'WHOLE'. ITS 'PRINCIPLES'  
AND 'STRUCTURE'

In formalising the MFI, we have approached *society* in the most neutral and formal manner possible, that is, by incorporating the fundamental perspectives that can be adopted in its study. This is consistent with the various dimensions of language, in order to account for the kind of 'truth' (beliefs/ideas) we deal with in 'worldviews' and *practical-social disciplines*. Thus, we have linked language and society through two notions they have in common: that of *structure*<sup>69</sup> and *function*<sup>70</sup>. We can do this because the *structure of language* in the West conveys what we have called the "*philosophy of suspicion*" and is thus formed by "*binomials*" such as "*language/speech*",<sup>71</sup> "*synchrony/diachrony*", "*signifier/signified*", etc. And, naturally, all of this is consistent with the binomials of metaphysical judgement: "*false/true*", "*good/bad*" and "*one/many*", and the binomial of the practical social disciplines: "*individual/social*". In this sense, the MFI relates *metaphysical judgement* to the *structure* of language, *society* and the *utilitarian function* of all this in the work of human knowledge, resolving problems relating to human happiness.

In its most formal sense, the MFI treats *society* as a 'whole'. Within this, both the *individuals* who make it up and everything that can be considered *common* are relevant. That is to say, it is something upon which all kinds of *predicative* operations can be performed and, thus, through the categories of *action* and *relation*, all kinds of *compositional*, *transformative*, *conflictual*, *tensional* and *dissolutive* operations, proceeding in this manner now enables us to explain the principles accounted for by the MFI, namely those of 'extension', 'intensity' and the 'dialectical', which we consider sufficient to clarify how the various 'worldviews' operate in *themselves* and in *relation to one another*. Let us therefore examine these principles.

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<sup>69</sup> Lepschy, G.C., pp. 1ff.

<sup>70</sup> Zubiri, X., pp. 89-90 and 512.

<sup>71</sup> De Saussure, F., p. 124.

### A) Principles of extension, dialectics and intensity

According to the *principle of extension*, the objects of *the set* (individuals) can be classified according to certain 'essential' properties, which can be appreciated in a 'common' or 'collective' manner<sup>72</sup>. We have already seen this with regard to the two basic ways of characterising society. Now, the *principle of extension* is considered in the MFI in three fundamental ways:

- a) *Epistemological*. – It is recognised that the *principles of extension* and *intensity* are inversely related when it comes to concepts – the more general a concept is, the less it tells us about the individuals it encompasses. And, indeed, this has implications when we study 'worldview', since, as has been said, very few *beliefs* and *ideas* are required to share a 'worldview'. However, let us note that this position is not so simple. We have explained previously how beliefs possess the property of being 'reveleable' and, thus, the capacity to attract ideas, arguments and, ultimately, *narratives*. In this context, the *principle of extension* operates in accordance with the principle of *non-contradiction*.
- b) *Quantitative*. – The *principle of extension* is socially *quantitative* (the number of people who *believe*, *think* and *value things* in the same way). Hence, for example, we can accept G. Colbert's definition of 'class' as 'the set of individuals who satisfy a function. That is to say, the set of individuals for whom the function in question generates a true proposition'<sup>73</sup>. In short, we can understand 'groups' in a certain 'narrative' and 'quantitative' order. Example: When we speak of a certain 'worldview', we can include within it the *set of people* who share a certain 'vision of the world'.

Naturally, 'worldviews' are interrelated. That is why we have said that what characterises the MFI is that it presents us with an

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<sup>72</sup> On the difference between 'common' and 'collective' concepts: Stuart Mill, J., (1946), p. 308.

<sup>73</sup> *Gran Enciclopedia Rialp*, 1973, XIV, pp. 484–485.

'order of relations' between 'worldviews', the most polar of which is the 'rival' (dialectical principle)<sup>74</sup>.

The *dialectical* principle is fundamental to understanding the relationship between "worldviews", as it is this principle that gives rise to *the principle of intensity*. And it is, as we have already noted, what gives substance to "ideology". Groups are amalgamated with varying degrees of *intensity* depending on the extent to which individuals adhere to certain *beliefs* and *ideas*. And this adherence is more clearly evident and, so to speak, visceral, when the "worldview" in question is confronted by an opposing one. We understand the polarity of "contradiction" to be that which occurs when the *beliefs* and *ideas* of one "worldview" become *unambiguous* in relation to another "worldview", with no possibility of subordination between the two "worldviews". For our part, we understand that there is "opposition" between "worldviews" when there is an *absolute difference* between them. Naturally, both "contradiction" and "opposition" encompass "conflict". It is in these *conflictual* states that groups come to operate *ideologically* under the "friend-enemy" framework popularised by Carl Schmitt<sup>75</sup>.

The principles of *extension*, *dialectic* and *intensity* also fall, as we can see, within the scope of the *functions of language*. Earlier, we referred to the structure of language through *pairs of concepts*. Well, this structure becomes operational in the various *functions of language*. In our case, we have linked society and language in the MFI through the notions of *structure* and *function*. Well then, continuing with this, in the MFI we have taken into account the *illocutionary*, *perlocutionary* and *doxastic* functions of language. Which, as we have already noted, does not prevent us from treating the phenomenon formally (society = set) and, thus, for example, the logical notions of membership " $\in$ " and inclusion " $\subset$ " or, where applicable, of *non-membership* or *non-inclusion*, etc.

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<sup>74</sup> If we consider "beliefs", it is said that "one faith exists in opposition to another faith" (Utz, A.F., 1989, p.17).

<sup>75</sup> Schmitt, C., (2022).

## B) Static and dynamic explanations of society

The evolution from *Enlightenment rationalism* to *Romantic rationalism* has often been explained in terms of the shift from *analytical logic* to *dialectics*. In many ways, this represented a methodological clash regarding the understanding of the *social sciences*. Thus, there was a divide between those who advocated analytical explanation and those who, on the contrary, sought a dialectical explanation. This led to a clash between analytical models – which viewed society in ‘static’ terms – whilst the ‘dialecticians’ were more in favour of ‘dynamic’ views of society. We cannot dwell on this debate and all its implications. However, what became obvious from the emergence of Sociology was that, to provide a comprehensive account of society, both types of explanation would be essential<sup>76</sup>. In this sense, the MFI accounts for both the ‘static’ explanations of society (*extensional aspect*) and the ‘dynamic’ ones (*dialectical aspect*). These two approaches to society are real and correspond precisely to the use of language at its various levels. Therefore, it neither regards society as a *fluid whole* – setting aside its *ideographic manifestations* (institutions, language, forms of government, currency, etc.) – nor does it consider society solely on the basis of those specific *cultural ideographies* to which it gives rise. In this sense, the MFI treats society as a *functional structure* dependent on ‘worldviews’ according to Sartre’s apt definition (in this case): ‘those strange internal realities, both organised and organising, synthetic products of a practical totalisation’<sup>77</sup>.

## C) Authority, power and the whole

When man apprehends reality, *he adapts* his understanding to the object (*adequatio rei et intellectus*). This operation gives rise to the *concept*, which is possible because the ‘entity’ presents itself to the intellect through the *species*<sup>78</sup>. This operation enables the intellect

<sup>76</sup> Comte, A., (1971), p.432.

<sup>77</sup> Sartre, J-P., p.161.

<sup>78</sup> St Thomas, I, 85, 2, ad resp.

to comprehend reality through 'categories' (*genus-species- difference-property-accident*). So, for example, when we ask *what man is* and answer, immediately all human beings fall under a *comprehensive set*. And this is unsettling, because this *judgement* is inevitable in each of us and through it we place others into 'judged' sets.

In this judgement, *beliefs*, as we have said, occupy a very prominent place. This will cause certain *sources of authority* to become extremely important when we establish our '*worldview*'. Moreover, there is no '*worldview*' without *sources of authority*. A liberal, a socialist, a feminist or an animal rights activist, for example, however simple their views may be, knows, by virtue of belonging to a '*group*', that that '*group*' has sources of authority. That remote reference is usually enough for most people to carry on with their '*worldview*'.

#### D) The political God and the political Man

What we have just said is very illuminating. For it follows that *authority* – without losing sight of its relationship with power – has *metaphysical-ontological* sources. Indeed, since the place where the *multiplicity* of the social or society as an '*entity*' must come together is *Being* as substance and act<sup>79</sup> (the second fundamental metaphysical division is that of *potency and act*). And, of course, in concrete terms this can only occur in two kinds of subjects (another binomial): either God or the Politician<sup>80</sup> – the ultimate sources of authority for the truth of *beliefs and practical social ideas*. It is at this very point that *Politics* and *Political Theology* connect. And so, according to the principle of *ontological perfection*, for some human politics must be directed (authority) by the '*best men*', whilst others consider that this role belongs solely to God<sup>81</sup>.

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<sup>79</sup> Cruz Cruz, J., p.196. We retain Aristotle's great ontological division between "*physical*" and "*metaphysical*" beings (Aristotle, IV, 1, 1025a 18–21).

<sup>80</sup> Cf. Schmitt, C., (2009).

<sup>81</sup> St Thomas Aquinas, among others, equates "order in the world" with "God's rule" (St Thomas, I, 2, 3 ad resp.). During the most catastrophic period of the 20th century, in which states led humanity into two world wars, Pope Pius XI proclaimed the Feast of Christ the King on 11 December 1925 (Encyclical *Quas Primas*). In this

In this sense, ontological excellence also serves to place trust in the *promise* of *political* or *theological* authority; thus, the *'faith'*, *'hope'* and *'love'* (commitment) of individuals and groups take shape in their *trust* in the *promise* of *authority*. We can put it this way: given a *'group'* of people, they will be united by a *'set of arguments'* comprising *beliefs* and *ideas*, which are maintained within the group through *the* organising *'principles'* we have seen (*extension* and *intensity*), legitimising *authority* through the *faith* and *hope* that the *promise* of a certain *future happiness* arouses in them.

## V.

### THE PRINCIPLE OF PARTICIPATION. THE EXEMPLARY CAUSE AND THE INTEGRITY OF THE WORLDVIEW

We have pointed out that *'ideologies'* express the *'rival'* dimension of *'worldviews'*. We have also seen how the core judgement of any *"worldview"* – *"good man/bad man"* ( ) – serves to lead to the *"ideological"* judgement (*"friend/enemy"*). Using this relationship, we have explained the place occupied by sources of *authority* and their relationship with *power*, as well as the *forms* of the comprehensive models of *"worldviews"*. We will now focus on the way in which *God*, *man* and *the world* are integrated into the *'worldview'*. That is to say, on the way in which these ideas fit into a *system of beliefs and ideas*. To do this, we must explain how the *integrating principle of participation* operates, the role played by the *exemplary cause*, and the result of *'integrity'* in the *explanation of the world*.

#### A) Principle of participation

The *principle of participation* in *set* theory states that two *sets* are more or less intersecting. *Metaphysically*, we say that *'something'* is part of *'the whole'*. From this, it is possible to construct an explanatory narrative of *'human beings in the world'* according to *God*, *man* and *the world*

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Encyclical, the Pope declared the obligation of rulers and individuals to submit to the Law of God. In this sense, it was an Encyclical with a clearly political character.

within a *'worldview'*. But, as has been said, in every *'worldview'* there is a theoretical and practical judgement, e.g. concerning man (*good man–bad man*); that is to say, a participatory relationship of man to the *good*, the *true* and *unity* is indicated. So we must return to the categories of the relationship between the *'worldview'* and the *transcendentals* (III. D) to account for this *participatory judgement*.

- a) The *'worldview'* is equivalent to the truth. – In this case, the *principle of participation* tells us that the human being is ontologically a good being, but one whose nature is damaged. That is to say, they participate in *the total order* of the 'Good', but within this there is a deficiency that prevents them from knowing and acting perfectly. In this sense, the human being would be *defectively good*. As this defect is common to all, this kind of "*worldview*" introduces "*forgiveness*" into the "*friend-enemy*" relationship (we cannot ask others to be what we ourselves are not). This is the framework, for example, of *Christian political theology* (in which *retributive justice* is linked to *forgiveness*).
- b) The *'worldview'* produces truth. – Human beings participate in the truth of which their *culture* is capable. In this sense, human beings navigate this participation by correcting it, criticising it, accepting it, and so on. In this model, the judgement of *'good man–bad man'* depends on *'culture'*. It leads to *'horizontal'* frameworks based on *'tolerance'*. To general, fictitious *'ideological'* relationships of *'friend-friend'*.
- c) The *'worldview'* is the pinnacle of truth. – To distinguish this thesis from the previous one, we must situate *truth* and *goodness* within the context of a process. Human beings would participate in this process in a *dialectical* manner. The "*good man–bad man*" dichotomy would be resolved positively over time. This approach results in the "*friend–friend*" relationship following a "*friend–enemy*" relationship.
- d) The "*worldview*" relates to truth relatively. – Human participation in the "*worldview*" would be interpretative and, at the same time, productive. Heidegger's *hermeneutic circle* is a highly illustrative figure of what such *participation* would look like. Here, the ideas of *good* or *evil* are open to interpretation. In this sense, relativism produces a greater number of

“worldviews” and, consequently, also of *ideological rivalries*. Indeed, because to distinguish it from position b) we must realise that no pronouncement is made regarding the superior goodness of the value of tolerance.

## B) The exemplary cause and integrity within the ‘worldview’

Something is said to be ‘whole’ when nothing is lacking in it<sup>82</sup>. Ontologically, a *being* is ‘whole’ when it fully accounts for its own *existence*. Example: We say that a lion is ‘whole’ insofar as it possesses the properties and virtues required to be a lion. When we relate the lion to the *ecosystem* in which it lives (the savannah – which is whole just as it is), we say that it appears “whole” and “ordered” within its *world*; it is what *it is* and *ought to be* where it is (“*adjustment*”). In the case of human beings, they do not possess a nature that is whole and ordered like that of the lion in our example. For humans, *being in the world* is a *problem* that affects both their own *integrity* and the *world in which they find themselves*. Unlike the lion, humans must ‘construct’ the *world* and their own *person* in order to fulfil their general vocation to happiness. Thus, inevitably, he must choose between *models of the perfect man* and *the perfect world* to which *he must ‘adjust’ himself* through desire, intelligence and will—in short, through his *action*.

The significance of these *models* is so profound that they form the bedrock of ‘worldviews’. They represent what people *believe* in. Indeed, this is so true that we can speak of these *models* as ‘*exemplary causes*’<sup>83</sup>. And so, it is from these *models* that the rules for our

<sup>82</sup> Aristotle, V, 26, 1023 b.

<sup>83</sup> We need to clarify what we mean by ‘*exemplary cause*’ in the context of ‘*worldview*’ and ‘*ideologies*’. In principle, ‘*exemplary cause*’ refers to the ideal archetype that serves as a model for doing something. Thus, the painter who has an idea (*exemplary cause*) and attempts to bring it to life on a canvas. In this sense, the “*exemplary cause*” can be somewhat difficult to distinguish from the “*formal cause*”. Now, we have said that man “*makes himself*” and “*transforms the world*” in the pursuit of happiness. Well then, in this sense, the “*exemplary cause*”, the core of the “*worldview*”, would be the model from which the *material, formal, final* and *efficient* causes of human action originate. One consequence of this is that “*worldviews*” and “*ideologies*” can adopt the causal apparatus of the “*sciences*” without, let us note, there being any greater claim to truth than that of the underlying “*worldview*”.

theoretical and practical *judgement* in society are drawn; that is to say, it is on *the basis of 'them'* that we say that man is 'good' or 'bad' and, thus, that *we ought* to be in such and such a way or that the *world* would be better off if we did such and such a thing... What elements make up this *model*? We have already seen them: *God* and *man*. In Christianity, this is very easy to see because of the union of God and Man in the Person of Christ.

Such is the power of these models as *exemplary causes* that they are what drive human beings to *imitative actions*. Hence, we can easily recognise a '*worldview*' and a '*culture*' by the type of person they hold up as an '*example*'. Now, the *narrative* describing this possible '*perfect man*' and '*brave new world*' is in itself *complete*; the model of the *perfect man* and *world* coordinates *beliefs* and *ideas* narratively to secure people's adherence to a shared *hope* and, ultimately, to ensure that *imitation in action* becomes a means of truly validating the *model*. This allows us to speak of people who fall under a '*worldview*' as a '*one*'. The motto taken from St Augustine by Pope Leo XIV expresses very well what we are trying to say: '*In illo uno unum*'. In short, as we can see, "*integrity*" and the "*exemplary cause*" are related to the principles of *extensionality*, *intensity* and *dialectics* in the functioning of the "*worldview*".

Every "*worldview*", therefore, is *integral* and *exemplary*. It explains any person's position by taking as its limits the objects of *God*, *man* and *the world*. It is the *worldview* that gives meaning to judgement and extensional adherence based on *beliefs* and, ultimately, that *justifies* the actions which man *believes* and *considers* necessary for his happiness. It is within this framework that '*authority*' will act through the '*promise*' upon the '*group*'. And, of course, due to the function of the '*exemplary cause*', '*exemplarity*' is required of authority.

## VI.

### COMPACTNESS, DIALECTIC AND IDEOLOGY

The fact that a set of *beliefs* and *ideas* that explain the '*world*' (*worldview*) *fully* justifies human beings' '*adaptation*' to the world does not yet sufficiently explain why the MFI is characterised by '*compactness*'. Moreover, we say that it is *compact* and, at the same time,

*dialectical*, which would, apparently, undermine the model. At this point, a distinction must be made. There is a difference between, for example, a ‘worldview’ that imposes itself on ‘another’ in ‘ideological’ rivalry, and a ‘worldview’ that is permeated by arguments from ‘another’, or, finally, a society dominated by a ‘worldview’ that eventually collapses. The MFI is concerned with all these situations, so it accommodates them and, naturally, in this sense, *dialectics* is part of the ‘cohesiveness’ of the model<sup>84</sup>. That is to say, at the most critical point of the MFI, the *dialectical* moment, the only thing it expresses is that any *comprehensive explanation of the world* may, in its *univocal* versions, lead to a *clash* with opposing or contrary explanations. This can be put this way: to understand a ‘worldview’, it must be contrasted with its rivals.

That said, and given that we have formalised the MFI using the functions of language, it will be appropriate to examine the historical relationship between the functions of language and truth within the context of *dialectics*.

### A) Considered antecedents of *dialectics* in the MFI

In our explanation, we shall use the *cultural* frameworks that we believe have been most relevant to understanding *dialectics* in the West.

#### a.1) *Man and God on trial*

The most immediate *dialectical* framework we can conceive of is that of a *judgement*. Well, that is the pattern that dominates the Old Testament. We may all be familiar with the idea that God judges the

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<sup>84</sup> Commenting on Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*, St Thomas Aquinas tells us: “The forms of opposites are diverse and contrary in matter, but in the soul they are, in a certain sense, the form of opposites. And this is because in matter forms are according to the being of the things informed by them, whilst in the soul they are according to the knowable and intelligible mode. Now, the being of one opposite is excluded by the being of another, but the knowledge of one opposite is not excluded by the knowledge of the other, but rather is *aided*” (*In. Met.* n.1405).

Hebrew people for disobeying the law and punishes them for it. What may be less well known is that God does not rule out the possibility that man might judge him<sup>85</sup>. God himself contemplates this as a possibility; we read in Isaiah: 'Do what is right... then let us *argue the case*' (Isaiah 1:18). Well, this is precisely what *Job* will do. He has been a righteous man and is suffering a series of misfortunes without knowing why. He feels treated by God as an enemy (□oyeb = enemy, see ch. 12–14, 24). From chapters 12–14 onwards, the idea of a trial with God takes hold of *Job* – despite what his friends tell him. It is most interesting that *Job* wishes to take God to court and, note, on the following conditions: that God should not use violence or terror, and that He should submit to the rule of *question* and *answer* (13:13–16). *Job* is confident that, through speech and the use of language, he will be able to succeed in his case (against God). We already know the outcome of the Book of *Job*. For us, the most important thing is that this book lies at the heart of what we have called the '*philosophy of suspicion*'; in this case, the *dialectical* duality is that of '*just/unjust*'.

## a.2) The '*two paths*' in Greek metaphysics

We have already seen that in the early days of Greek metaphysics, Parmenides' poem on '*being*' employs the schema of the '*two paths*'. The assertion that there is a path of '*being*', which is identified with '*truth*', implies the assertion that there is another path, that of '*non-being*',<sup>86</sup> that is, of '*falsehood*'. In any case, and this is key, human beings *cannot avoid making a choice*. Man must walk, and it is advisable that he chooses correctly which way to go.

Now, on the subject of the '*two paths*', one might well ask whether the path of '*non-being*' holds *water*. That is to say, whether there exists '*a false and evil reality that is opposed to or contrary to the reality of 'being*'; or, alternatively, whether *falsehood* and *evil* are a diminution or defect of *truth* and *goodness*; or, conversely to this latter assertion, whether *truth* and *goodness* might not be a perfection attained from '*non-being*', that is, from *error* and *evil*. In this sense, what role do the

<sup>85</sup> On this idea in the Psalms in relation to the '*social contract*', see Atticus, C., 2023 (2).

<sup>86</sup> Frag. 2.

means play? Does the good justify the use of evil means? The first thesis implies a *Manichaean* judgement (*conflict*), the second judges from the *perspective of the perfection of being* (evil as a diminution of the good), the third judges perfection in an evolutionary manner (the good as an evolution from evil). It is through questions such as these that we can understand subsequent developments regarding *dialectics*.

### a.3) *On the dialectical distinction in 'being'*

Plato uses *dialectic* as a means of distinguishing the true nature of 'being' from that which 'is not'; from there, he ascends to the world of *true being* (the Idea)<sup>87</sup>. This ascent does not take place in isolation. It occurs through *discussion*, by asking and answering questions (e.g. *Job*). It is in this way that the path to *truth* is illuminated<sup>88</sup>. To this end, the first step is to establish a *unifying idea* that is accessible to all participants<sup>89</sup> (a common ground). From there, a distinction will be drawn between the 'right side' and the 'left side' and, in this way, the 'right side' will in turn be subdivided<sup>90</sup>. On the 'left side', the *inappropriate*, the *erroneous* and the *evil* are progressively discarded. In this way, *truth* is the result of a process of *unveiling* in which, as we can see, *dialectical discourse* is fundamental. Now, the "left-hand side" has consistency. And here we must be very careful to distinguish between *contradiction*, *opposition* and *difference*. The *opposite* of 'white' is 'black', but the *contrary* of white is 'red', 'yellow', 'green', etc., that is to say, everything which, whilst being *different*, allows us to clearly appreciate what 'whiteness' is. In this sense, a certain gradation of 'being' is possible; according to the example, being 'more or less' white<sup>91</sup> and even conceiving the perfection of 'whiteness'.

Plato will call this process – involving 'conjunction' and 'disjunction' – 'coionomia', and it is precisely this, he will say, that constitutes

<sup>87</sup> *The Republic*, Book VI, 511b–c.

<sup>88</sup> *Letters*, VII, 344 b.

<sup>89</sup> *Phaedrus*, 265 c.

<sup>90</sup> *Phaedrus*, 266 a-b.

<sup>91</sup> *Philebus*, 14c and 16c; *Republic*, 582b.

*dialectic*<sup>92</sup>. In this sense, *division* arises from “unity” or, conversely, “unity” from *division*,<sup>93</sup> which, let us note, leaves the “whole” (to use our terminology) as the principal category of Platonic *dialectic*. For the next case of dialectic we are going to examine, it is essential to note that, although in all of Plato’s dialogues there is an approach to the *truth*, in many cases the dialogues are concluded without a solution. In other words, Platonic *dialectic is not always conclusive*.

#### a.4) *The analytical, the dialectical and the rhetorical*

Aristotle is the great developer of *logic*, *dialectic* and *rhetoric*. The Stagirite realised that there exists a form of knowledge determined by premises that are indisputably true; that is to say, a kind of knowledge that is truly necessary. He called this form of knowledge ‘analytic’. We do not consider it correct to judge that *analytical* knowledge is superior to *probable* knowledge, when one seeks to extend that assessment to encompass all of reality<sup>94</sup>. In Aristotle’s view, some realities are amenable to one type of knowledge and others to another. That said, Aristotle studies *dialectic* in the eight books of the *Topics* and in the *Sophistical Refutations*. What we wish to emphasise is that, for Aristotle, the proper domain of *dialectic* is *dialogue* and that, as we have stated previously, *dialectic* is a type of knowledge in which the *necessary*, the *probable*<sup>95</sup> and the *persuasive* are blended. In this sense, the opposition between the disputants who argue, *reinforcing* and *combating* arguments, shapes the *dichotomy* characteristic of Aristotelian *dialectic*<sup>96</sup>. When we bear this in mind, we can see the extent of the correlation that may exist between Plato and Aristotle in their ideas of ‘unity’, ‘division’, ‘being’ and the ‘whole’ – and, of course, their differences. For Aristotle, there is knowledge that is necessarily true, other knowledge that is probable, and – pay attention, for this is a most interesting step – Whilst for Plato the purpose of *discussion* was

<sup>92</sup> *The Sophist*, 253 b.

<sup>93</sup> *Sophist*, 268 c.

<sup>94</sup> Kant, I., (1998), *Intro.*, A 58, B 52, A 60, B 85, A 298, B 354.

<sup>95</sup> *Prior Analytics*, I, 1, 24a; *Topics*, I, 1, 100b, 21 ff.

<sup>96</sup> *Topics*, II.

to move towards the truth, Aristotle realises that *opposition* – and not merely *difference* – is another way of arriving at the truth, thereby avoiding an inconclusive discussion. It is the use of language that allows *truth* to *prevail* (an argument that articulates the reality under discussion according to an organisation of genera and species)<sup>97</sup>. Whereas in Plato the discussion on the truth of something could end without a clear resolution, Aristotle formalises a set of rules to ensure this does not happen. Put another way, whilst for Plato *dialectic* is guided solely by the horizon of a truth as an Idea, for Aristotle the *procedure* of the discussion is in many cases just as important for reaching the truth. If a speaker refers to term B as a species of genus A, they are obliged to uphold the series of relationships linking B to A and, of course, the division that may arise from this. If they succeed, their position will be reinforced (χατασχευάζειν) in the face of their opponent's combative stance (ἀνασχευάζειν). If we now apply this framework to discussions, for example, on justice, we can appreciate the importance of the discussion process in arriving at the truth. We have examples of this in our own time. Civil procedural law, for instance, links the claim, the subject matter of the proceedings, the evidence, the legal classification of the case through argumentation, and the outcome as a means of doing justice to the truth.

So, what role do *beliefs* play in Aristotle's thought? There are discussions in which they are of paramount importance. For Aristotle, knowledge regarding *beliefs* is possible. Thus, in Aristotle's more mature *dialectical* work, this will be the technique of refuting a thesis by deducing its contradiction from premises grounded in opinion; that is, the technique of confronting any given assertion with a more or less organised set of *beliefs*<sup>98</sup>. From this, we can understand the problem whereby both Aristotle and St Thomas Aquinas come to attribute a certain reality to '*non-being*'<sup>99</sup>.

We now have the fundamental ideas with which to explain what subsequently happened with *dialectics*. The Stoics would eventually call '*dialectics*' what in Aristotle can be explained in

<sup>97</sup> *Topics*, IV, V and VI.

<sup>98</sup> *Sophistic Elements*, 2, 165b, 2–4.

<sup>99</sup> "We also say that the '*non-being*' is '*non-being*'" (Aristotle, *Met.*, 1003 b 10; St Thomas, *In Met.* n.539).

different ways (logic and dialectics)<sup>100</sup>. In the Middle Ages, the Renaissance and the Modern era, authors will oscillate between different degrees, ranging from elevating *dialectics* to the status of the science of sciences – as in the case of Peter of Spain<sup>101</sup> – or, in the case of Kant, who despises it<sup>102</sup>.

#### a.5) *Synthesis of thesis and antithesis*

It is Hegel's *dialectic* that has had the greatest influence from the time of its emergence to the present day. However, what has perhaps been least explained is its metaphysical framework and the fact that its author uses it to underpin a system based on a '*belief*'. In other words, it is a clear example of what we have termed ideological '*revelabile*'. For Hegel, '*pure being*' and '*pure nothingness*' are in a certain relationship<sup>103</sup>: either they are the same, or they are distinct and contradictory, or, finally, one is destined to disappear into the other. For these three ideas to occur simultaneously, "*pure being*" and "*pure nothingness*" must meet in time, that is, in "*becoming*"<sup>104</sup>. And how do they meet, whether to be, to contradict each other, or to synthesise? *Dialectically*.

From here, we can turn to the second question. Hegel will use *dialectics* as a method for resolving *religious* and *political* problems (recall the relationship we have been examining between *political theology* and *politics*), that is to say, the question of what *to believe*. One of the issues that most concerned the young Hegel was, precisely, the relationship between the State and the Christian religion; that is to say, in the terminology we have been using, the question of *belief* in politics or in God. Hegel was not satisfied with Kant's reduction

<sup>100</sup> Cicero, (1991), II, 38, 157.

<sup>101</sup> Hispano, P., 7, 41.

<sup>102</sup> Kant, I., (1998), A 297, B 353.

<sup>103</sup> There is a relationship of meaning between "*being*" and "*non-being*" such that if one is overlooked, one falls into meaningless logicism. The *equal* cannot be defined as the *negation of the unequal*. Conversely, the *unequal can be defined in terms of the equal*. If this rule is not respected, the human mind ends up lost in imaginative conceptual abstraction. And this is what happens to Hegel.

<sup>104</sup> Hegel, G.W.F., (1982), p. 69.

of Christianity to a formal morality<sup>105</sup>. In *\*Volksreligion und Christentum\** (1793–4), Hegel argues that a *\*Volksreligion\** (religion of the people) must underpin the *political and social structure*. In doing so, Hegel was partly emphasising the idea—originating with Luther and with which Kant sympathised<sup>106</sup>—of identifying *society* and the *state* with the *Germanic spirit liberated from Catholic Christianity*. The attacks on the Church of Rome found in this work and, more extensively, in *\*Positivität der christlichen Religion\** (1795–6), are his way of discrediting the importance of the Church’s political power in social life. In this sense, in the *practical-social disciplines*, Hegel will employ the *dialectic of reason* (the dialectical framework is drawn from Fichte) to transform the State into the resolving unity of the thesis of the social and the antithesis of the individual<sup>107</sup>. In this sense, the *‘spirit of the people’*<sup>108</sup> will be what Hegel uses to determine the institutions and norms of the State which, according to him, is most perfectly developed in the *Germanic people*<sup>109</sup>. In short, Hegel’s *dialectic* is resolute (*das Aufgehoben*), *evolutionary* and underpins a *fideism* in the State. In this sense, through this philosophy, one arrives at an interpretation of the spirit, history, society and the sciences as a totality, as a unified whole,<sup>110</sup> in which *to believe*.

There are other *purely negative* dialectics to which we have devoted some work<sup>111</sup>. We refer the reader to that.

## B) Dialectics in the MFI

What matters to the MFI of *dialectics* is, quite simply, *‘judgement’*. Aristotle said: ‘It is a “science” to contemplate *opposites*’<sup>112</sup>. He goes on to

<sup>105</sup> Kant, I., (1972).

<sup>106</sup> Kant, I., (1991), p. 264.

<sup>107</sup> Hegel, G.W.F., (1930), §§.257-360.

<sup>108</sup> Hegel, G.W.F., (1993), p.209.

<sup>109</sup> Hegel, G.W.F., (2016), pp.717. The defence of codification in Germany takes this idea into account. On the other hand, Hitler’s racism in Germany has more disturbing explanations than the economic crisis of 1923; it was forged from Lutheranism and in the universities where the doctrine of the believer who knew nothing of theology (Kant) and the atheist theologian (Hegel) was propagated.

<sup>110</sup> Hegel, G.W.F., (1997), §11 and §81.

<sup>111</sup> Atticus, C., 2024 (2).

<sup>112</sup> Aristotle, *Met.*, 1004a 9–10.

say that ‘*judgement*’ is a certain composition of concepts as things that are one<sup>113</sup>. For his part, Saint Augustine will say: “order is the arrangement that assigns to different and equal things the place that corresponds to *them*”<sup>114</sup>. These statements lie at the heart of the MFI, but they require some clarification depending on the “*worldview*”. The *dialectical* aspect of our MFI does not align exactly with any of the proposals that have been put forward throughout the history of *dialectics*. All possibilities are open. After all, what we are saying is that these *dialectical* proposals are characteristic of certain “*worldviews*”. In this sense, it can lead to a judgement on, for example, Hegel’s *dialectic* in history in contrast to that of Saint Augustine. That is to say, it encompasses both the possibility that *dialectics* culminates in *truth/falsehood*, and in a *lack of resolution*; in the *overcoming* of a ‘*worldview*’ through argumentation; in a certain *complementarity*; in a *synthesis of opposites*; and, of course, in an elucidation of the true through the apophatic. This allows us to address all possible relationships between ‘*worldviews*’ and, ultimately, to address both the *analytical* and the *dialectical*. That is to say, as we have stated, the MFI is maximally *additive*, *reciprocal* and *narrative*. In this sense, the MFI neither resolves nor judges any model. It simply highlights the idea that in the *practical social sciences* the “*narrative*” of the “*worldview*” is fundamental and that *mathematical* and *quantitative models* can be useful within it.

## VII. IDEOGRAPHY

*Ideography* is an important part of the MFI<sup>115</sup>. The *cultural outcomes* that emerge through the interplay of ‘*worldviews*’ within a society over time are regarded as crucial elements of study. In this sense, the MFI does not take a stance on certain irreconcilable antagonisms between the rational and the historical. Both past events and the necessary reasoning involved in *ideographic* concretisation can prove highly revealing. And so, the ‘*city*’, ‘*language*’, ‘*capital*’,

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<sup>113</sup> Aristotle, *De anima*, III, 6, 430a27.

<sup>114</sup> St Augustine, *De Civ. Dei*, XIX, 13, 1.

<sup>115</sup> Atticus, C., 2022 (2).

'constitution', 'money', 'legal norm', 'people' and 'state' are just a few examples of *ideographies*. *Ideography* is *structurally concrete*. It is the concrete determination of MFI *functionality*. What we see unfolding as '*judgement*' within the MFI subsequently takes concrete form in various *ideographies*. So, on this final point, we shall attempt to describe the *dualities* of '*judgement*' considered within the MFI which, by '*turning*' the human being through the *social*, bring about the emergence of different *ideographies*.

#### b.1) "Mind-world" duality

The first duality is that which affects the *ideographies* of *beliefs* and *ideas*. We are referring to the '*mind-world*' duality. The most concrete *ideography* of this duality is *language*. Let us see how this *duality* operates in its *structural formation*. The emergence of language as an *ideographic instrument* would help us to explain this duality. But we are going to take a different approach, which we believe may be more illuminating. Let us consider the scientist who specialises in physics. To him, nature appears as an *unknown*. But why is reality an *unknown*? After all, we might think it is not necessary to know more than what constitutes '*reality there*'. But the physicist is not satisfied; he wants to know more; he wants to know the reason for '*reality there*', that is, its *causes*, its *laws*. If he knows them, let us note, he takes *control* of '*that*'. We believe the expression '*to gain mastery*' is very apt; knowing the *law* of '*reality there*' will allow one to *arrange* and *use* '*reality there*' with *precision* and, therefore, with *predictability*. So, for the physicist, *taking control* of reality means knowing the *law* of '*reality out there*' in s to its *measurement*. Thus, the physicist tackles the questions posed by '*reality out there*' with a *set of measuring instruments* to explain and predict '*reality out there*' within a *physical theory*. From the moment we realise this, we see, contrary to what is commonly thought, that physics is quite *biased* and even *illusory*. '*Biased*', because clearly, of the '*reality out there*', it is only interested in what it can *measure* and, therefore, sets aside what it cannot measure with the instruments available '*now*'. But, furthermore, we have said that it has something '*illusory*' about it. This is a more delicate matter. We have been accustomed since

childhood to the idea that the *quantities* with which physics operates follow the laws of composition of algebraic numbers; that is to say, we can subtract metres from seconds or multiply kilos by metres for the simple reason that we can do so with the real numbers that accompany the quantities. This has significant consequences, for it then makes just as much sense to speak of the “*real*” dimension of a *quantity* as of the “*real*” name of an object (note that we have reached a key point for the language of physics and everyday speech). In fact, the issue is so thorny that one of the fundamental questions in the algebra of *quantities* is to clarify the relationships between *quantities* independently of those of *numbers*. We are only interested in this question. For from it we deduce two things that are indeed important to our subject: that we have equated ‘*exact knowledge*’ with ‘*mastery*’ and, secondly, that those ‘*more exact*’ forms of knowledge we can consider (such as those of physics) have, in reality, required us to take a ‘*detour*’ via the ‘*entity*’ through ‘*measurement*’. From here, we observe that, in reality, we are constantly relying on *ideographies*, amongst which is, in this case, the language of physics. And if we move into the field of philosophy, we observe that the same thing happens. We establish categories and principles in order to ‘*navigate*’ through ‘*being*’ to answer the most radical questions about *God, man* and the *world*. Thus, just as metres and seconds are *quantities* in physics, categories such as ‘*action*’, ‘*substance*’, ‘*passion*’, etc., are ‘*quantities*’ in philosophy, with which it attempts to measure reality through a certain *explanatory narrative*.

Well, in the case of ‘*worldviews*’, exactly the same thing happens. The fundamental question here, as we have explained, concerns ‘*happiness*’ and, of course, in this case, the ‘*ideology*’ is constituted by ‘*interests*’. In other words, it is that aspect of desire which is at stake in the ‘*turn*’. It is these “*interests*” that serve as the “*magnitude*” and “*category*” for “*measuring*” the scope of *action* and the position of “*man in society*”. Now, if it were the “*interests*” of a single man that “*turned*”, obviously the “*culture*” that would develop would be a carbon copy of that hypothetical human being; but, as human beings are *social beings*, in practice the “*interests*” of each individual are bound to coordinate with or clash against those of others. We now have the ‘*ideography*’ of the ‘*general interest*’.

And so, we can then speak of the duality that exists in the 'turn' between 'particular interests' and 'social interests'. Well then, all of this gives rise to specific 'ideographies' through words such as 'person', 'contract', 'price', 'money', 'property', 'right', 'State', etc.

### b.2) 'Theory-experience' duality

The 'mind-world' duality calls for a 'theory-experience' duality. The fact that scientific knowledge is something to *be believed* in (even if we know nothing of any positive science) is something we observe through the technology we use (which derives from it) and the that makes our lives easier. Well then, we will always demand a practical manifestation from any "worldview". Its basic form as a "promise" demands it. Even Christ performed *miracles*. In this sense, the "miracle" is an *ideogram*, just like the protocol that leads to curing an illness through the use of pharmacology or a mobile phone.

Now, just as there are theories that can be tested against the evolution of technology, there are *beliefs* and *practical ideas* that cannot be tested in this way. We are referring to ethical or political theories. A 'good man' is verified through experience in a very different way from the quality of a telephone. And this is fundamental. For we might take it for granted that technical progress implies human progress, and, unfortunately, this is not the case. In any case, there are *ideographs* concerning the good man. Think of the images of the Saints or, for some, the Declarations of the Rights of Man, etc.

### b.3) The duality of revision and conservation

'Mind/reality', 'theory/experience' are dualities that give rise to *ideographies* through the 'turn' of the human being towards the 'cultural' (composed of *ideographies*). Now, this "turn" is the one taken by each person in a society, so that, inevitably, we must introduce a duality that allows us to factor in *time* in relation to the *freedom* of every human being who comes into this world. And so, societies change because the people within them "turn" with their new

interests, proposing aims different from those that existed some time ago. In this sense, the *'revision/conservation'* duality accounts for change over time and for *ideographs* such as the flag, emblems, heresy, *'values'* (understood objectively), etc.

#### b.4) *The duality of ideality and reality*

The *ideogram* that best encapsulates humanity's stance towards the future is that of *paradise*. We have already referred to this (II.C), so we shall not dwell on it further. Suffice it to say that it implies the duality of *'ideality/reality'* and, as is easy to see, draws the others along with it. Indeed, all these *ideographic dualities* are existentially interrelated. Our *unsatisfied reality* leads us to envisage *'happy worlds'* (paradises) – *ideality/reality* –; we *'circle'* around the *'cultural sphere'*, asking and answering questions about what is urgent and important for our happiness, preserving and revising (*preservation/revision*) the *cultural*, and thus confirming our *beliefs* and *ideas* about the world (*mind/world*) with what we actually experience (*theory/practice*).

### **Conflict of interest**

The author declares that he has no conflict of interest.

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